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A B S T R A C T
As we are living in an interconnected world, serious privacy concerns
have been raised due to the ever increasing data collection. As a re-
sult, many privacy-preserving methodologies have been proposed for
various domains. However, in order to argue about the effectiveness
of such methodologies, it is necessary to quantify privacy. Further-
more, such a quantification should be within the grasp of users and
developers, as an important factor of any technology is adoption. In
this thesis, we design privacy metrics in order to investigate the pri-
vacy guarantees offered by various defenses. In addition, we develop
tools that can be used either by system designers for developing more
privacy-preserving applications, or by users to estimate their privacy.
The analysis in performed on three domains where millions of users
already contribute data.
The first part of this thesis investigates a previously unexplored di-
mension of location privacy: mobile crowdsourcing, where users share
streams of their location data. In this thesis we shed light as to whether
traditional location privacy mechanisms can be directly applied in this
scenario. We elaborate on why this use case is radically different than
the widely studied case of location-based services. Then, using novel
privacy metrics, and realistic utility functions and datasets, derived di-
rectly from crowdsourcing projects, we highlight why existing privacy
defenses are inadequate. In order to enable further research in this
direction and spawn privacy-preserving crowdsourcing applications,
we provide some best-practices guidelines, directions for the develop-
ment of novel defense mechanisms, and we show how our work can
be used as a tool to measure privacy and utility loss.
In the second part of the thesis, we explore the privacy guarantees
of aggregation schemes in smart metering, by modeling privacy as an
indistinguishability game. In particular, we explore how many house-
hold have to be aggregated in order to provide meaningful privacy
guarantees. We explain why such a modeling is flexible, able to simu-
late a variety of adversaries with different background information,
and how the proposed game can be re-purposed to investigate as to
whether single profiles belong in an aggregate or not. We investigate
various aggregation sizes for privacy leakage, as well as, properties of
an aggregate that affect the privacy guarantees.
The last part of this thesis investigates privacy in microdata publica-
tion. A tool is proposed, that enables users to estimate their privacy
level, based on a set of preferences they want to share with a service
provider (eg., movies watched, music listened to etc.), a-priori sharing
them. The tool does not require full access to the providers’ database
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but rather relies on users’ choices and the popularity of those. We
describe the underlying privacy metric and the algorithms composing
the tool. Using actual user data and comparing the tool’s results with
a well established privacy metric, we show that the tool is able to
approximate users’ privacy levels.
The privacy evaluation in the domain of mobile crowdsourcing
highlights that the utility functions of the domain are different than
those used in traditional location-privacy literature. For this reason,
the utility-privacy trade-off of various defenses is different than the
one observed in the scenario of location-based services, allowing us
to understand why existing defenses are not deployed in practice by
crowdsourcing projects. For the domain of smart metering, our work
illustrates that aggregation-based privacy mechanisms are inadequate
for small or medium sized aggregates of electricity consumption data.
Users’ electricity consumption patterns can be quite distinct, and
with some auxiliary information sensitive data can be leaked from the
aggregated report. Last, the user-friendly tool proposed for the domain
of microdata publications, as well as the metrics and tools developed
for the domains of mobile crowdsourcing and smart metering, can
enable non-technical users to better understand the privacy risks of
sharing unprotected data, and guide application developers towards
developing privacy-preserving systems.
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Z U S A M M E N FA S S U N G
Da wir in einer vernetzten Welt leben, treten vermehrt ernsthafte
Bedenken hinsichtlich des Datenschutzes aufgrund der ständig zuneh-
menden Datenerhebung auf. Infolgedessen wurden viele Methoden
zum Schutz der Privatsphäre für verschiedene Domänen vorgeschla-
gen. Um jedoch die Wirksamkeit dieser Methoden zu zeigen, ist es
erforderlich die Privatsphäre zu quantifizieren. Darüber hinaus sollte
eine solche Quantifizierung unter Kontrolle der Nutzer und Entwickler
liegen, da Verwendbarkeit ein wichtiger Faktor für jede Technologie ist.
In dieser Arbeit entwerfen wir Datenschutzkennzahlen, um die Daten-
schutzgarantien zu untersuchen, die verschiedene Schutzmechanis-
men bieten. Darüber hinaus entwickeln wir Werkzeuge, die entweder
von Systementwicklern für die Entwicklung weiterer Datenschutz-
Tools verwendet werden können oder von Benutzern, um ihre Privat-
sphäre einzuschätzen. Die Analyse wurde in drei Datensammlungen
durchgeführt, zu denen Millionen von Benutzern bereits Daten beitra-
gen.
Der erste Teil dieser Arbeit untersucht eine bisher unerforschte Di-
mension des Datenschutzes von Standorten: mobiles Crowdsourcing,
bei dem Benutzer Streams ihrer Standortdaten gemeinsam nutzen.
In dieser Arbeit untersuchen wir, ob traditionelle Mechanismen für
den Schutz von Standortdaten direkt auf dieses Szenario angewendet
werden können. Wir erläutern, warum sich dieser Anwendungsfall
grundlegend von dem weithin untersuchten Fall ortsbasierter Dienste
unterscheidet. Dann verwenden wir neuartige Datenschutzkennzahlen,
realistische Hilfsfunktionen und Daten, die direkt aus Crowdsourcing-
Projekten stammen, um zu zeigen, dass heutige Verteidigungsmecha-
nismen der Privatsphäre unzureichend sind. Um weitere Forschung
zu animieren Privatsphäre schützende Crowdsourcing-Anwendungen
hervorzubringen, stellen wir einige Best Practice-Richtlinien sowie An-
weisungen für die Entwicklung neuartiger Abwehrmechanismen vor,
und wir zeigen, wie unsere Arbeit als Instrument zur Messung der Pri-
vatsphäre und des einhergehenden Verlustes von Nutzen verwendet
werden kann.
Im zweiten Teil der Arbeit untersuchen wir die Garantien für den
Datenschutz von Aggregationsverfahren in Smart Metering durch
Modellierung der Privatsphäre als Ununterscheidbarkeits-Spiel. Ins-
besondere untersuchen wir, wie viele Haushalte zusammengefasst
werden müssen, um angemessene Privatsphäre zu gewährleisten. Wir
erklären, warum eine solche Modellierung flexibel ist sowie eine
Vielzahl von Angreifern mit unterschiedlichen Hintergrundinforma-
tionen simulieren kann und wie das vorgeschlagene Spiel wieder ver-
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wendet werden kann, um zu prüfen, ob ein Profil zu einem Aggregat
gehört oder nicht. Wir untersuchen verschiedene Aggregationsgrößen
auf das Eindringen in die Privatsphäre sowie welche Eigenschaften
eines Aggregats die Datenschutzgarantien beeinflussen.
Der letzte Teil dieser Arbeit untersucht den Datenschutz bei der
Veröffentlichung von Mikrodaten. Es wird ein Tool vorgeschlagen,
mit dem Benutzer das Privatsphäre-Niveau ihrer Sammlung von
Präferenzen (z. B. angesehene Filme, gehörte Musik, usw.) einschätzen
können, um zu beurteilen, ob sie diese mit den Diensteanbietern
teilen möchten. Das Tool erfordert jedoch keinen vollständigen Zu-
griff auf die Datenbank der Anbieter sondern verlässt sich auf die
Auswahl der Benutzer und deren Beliebtheit. Wir beschreiben die
zugrunde liegende Datenschutzmetrik und die Algorithmen, aus de-
nen das Tool besteht. Anhand von tatsächlichen Benutzerdaten und
dem Vergleich der Ergebnisse des Tools mit einer bereits etablierten
Datenschutzkennzahl zeigen wir, dass das Tool eine Schätzung des
Datenschutz-Niveaus ermöglicht.
Die Bewertung der Privatsphäre im Bereich des mobilen Crowd-
sourcing hebt hervor, dass die Utility-Funktionen der Domäne anders
sind als diejenigen, die in der traditionellen Literatur zum Thema
Standortdatenschutz verwendet werden. Aus diesem Grund unter-
scheidet sich der Kompromiss von Nutzen und Privatsphäre zwischen
den verschiedenen Schutzmechanismen von dem, der im Szenario
ortsbasierter Dienste beobachtet wurde. Das erlaubt uns zu verste-
hen, warum bestehende Abwehrmechanismen in der Praxis nicht in
Crowdsourcing-Projekten eingesetzt werden. Für den Bereich Smart
Metering zeigt unsere Arbeit, dass aggregationsbasierte Mechanis-
men zum Schutz der Privatsphäre für kleine oder mittlere Aggre-
gate von Stromverbrauchsdaten unzureichend sind. Die Stromver-
brauchsmuster der Benutzer können sehr unterschiedlich sein, sodass
mit einigen Hilfsinformationen vertrauliche Daten aus dem Aggregat
abgeleitet werden können. Das vorgeschlagene benutzerfreundliche
Werkzeug für die Domäne von Mikrodatenpublikationen sowie die en-
twickelten Metriken und Werkzeuge für die Bereiche mobiles Crowd-
sourcing und Smart Metering können nicht-technischen Benutzern
ein besseres Verständnis der Datenschutzrisiken bei ungeschützter
Freigabe von Daten ermöglichen und leiten Anwendungsentwickler
in Richtung Entwicklung von Systemen zum Schutz der Privatsphäre.
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1
I N T R O D U C T I O N
The need for privacy has always been relevant. From the ancient Greek
times there has been a distinction between the public and the private.
However, advances in technology played an important role to the
shape of later privacy definitions. A very early definition of privacy
was by Judge Cooley in 1879, referring to it as the right to be left
alone [51]. In a later definition in 1967, Westin refers to privacy as
individual’s ability to control or delete information about themselves
as well as, decide how such information is communicated [154]. The
advances in telecommunications though, have changed the way infor-
mation is transmitted, stored and processed. Nowadays, Nissenbaum’s
work on contextual integrity, amongst others, frames privacy as an
appropriate flow of information and recognizes five key parameters:
data subject, sender, recipient, information type, and transmission
principle [117].
Today’s massive and detailed collection of information about indi-
viduals violates their privacy and in order to preserve it, only relevant
and the minimum information necessary for specific tasks needs to
be collected. The collected information though, should not allow the
inference of unintended sensitive information. However, preventing
inference attacks from published data turns out to be a rather compli-
cated issue, and the main motivating problem of this thesis.
Humans are social beings and belong to many different groups and
social circles and hence, it is only natural that with the widespread
adoption of the Internet, such behavior would extend to the web.
Indeed, depending on their interests, people participate in various
online communities, forums and web-platforms. Contrary to real life
though, where people (usually) carefully choose what information
they share with whom, such an attitude is not yet common on the web.
In addition, it is not usually clear to people what kind of sensitive
information published data carry.
It is known that as little as one’s queries to online search engines re-
veal her interests [131, 138, 147]. Lately, people have been outsourcing
their preferences, photos, videos or even DNA test results to social
media. Such data however can be used for discrimination. It is known
that recruiters and hiring managers systematically search applicants
social media profiles [43, 118]. More specifically, candidates have been
disqualified because of posts they publish on their profiles, unprofes-
sional screen names, inappropriate photos or too frequent posting [72].
Furthermore, advances in machine learning and the abundance of
available data enable rather dangerous inferences. It has been demon-
1
2 introduction
strated that sensitive data such as religion, sexual preference, location
or health history can be inferred directly or indirectly from someone’s
online activity [96]. Moreover, the photos someone publishes can be
used to predict markers of depression [133].
Private personal information can also be inferred from shared
location data. Smartphones have embedded global positioning sys-
tem (GPS) receivers or use the device’s sensors for localization pur-
poses. An increasing number of applications use the device’s position
to offer location-based services (LBSs). Such services may send noti-
fications about nearby friends, interesting locations based on users’
preferences and weather or traffic alerts. Furthermore, besides assisting
users, various companies collect useful statistics from users’ where-
abouts. Such measurements, however, carry extremely sensitive data to
providers, as workplaces or home addresses can be determined [74, 97].
Moreover, social relationships as well as routines can also be inferred
[36, 75]. For example, being in close proximity with someone during
weekend nights might suggest that this person is a friend, while a ro-
mantic involvement can be inferred (with some probability) by people
spending several nights together. Even though various anonymization
techniques might be applied to location datasets, re-identification at-
tacks are still possible because, as little as the combination of home
and work location, or the shops one visited, is enough to uniquely
identify individuals [56, 57, 157].
Smartphones however, are not the only devices with Internet connec-
tion capabilities and sensors. Nowadays, many other devices, capable
of measurements and an Internet connection, are part of modern
houses. Smart devices that measure the electricity consumption in
households can pose a serious privacy threat. Such devices collect data
regarding the electricity usage of all appliances in a household. Even
though such a data collection has not a malicious purpose, but rather
to allow energy providers to better manage the distribution of energy,
post-processing of the collected data can reveal sensitive information
about the owner. For instance, by looking into the usage patterns of
such smart devices, one can infer when a building is occupied, how
many people are present, peoples’ sleeping patterns or even movie
and music preferences.
As it is clear that individuals’ privacy can be violated by vari-
ous technologies used in everyday life, many privacy defenses have
been proposed for a variety of domains. Such privacy-preserving
technologies frequently rely (but not only) on cryptography, aggrega-
tion, selective hiding, anonymization, noise addition or generalization.
However, in order to argue about the effectiveness of privacy preserv-
ing technologies, there is a need to define what privacy is and ways
to quantify it. Even though various privacy definitions are abstract
enough to define privacy in many domains, such as indistinguishabil-
ity or adversarial error, the specifics of each area, such as the nature
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of the collected data, are quite distinct. For instance, measuring how
private one is when sharing his location data, which is in the form
of coupled coordinates with time, is different than measuring one’s
privacy in microdata publication, which is in essence a collection of
his preferences in a domain. Furthermore, as it will become clear in
Chapter 2, even collected data of the same nature require different
treatment depending on the resolution in which they were gathered.
Hence, it follows naturally that privacy quantification must be treated
as a domain dependent problem.
However, simply proposing privacy metrics and tools does not guar-
antee that they will be used. A fundamental problem of any proposed
technology is adoption. First, researchers need to demonstrate the pri-
vacy dangers involved in the publication of raw user data in order to
sensitize users, and deploy ready to use privacy-enhancing technolo-
gies. In order to sensitize users, the proposed privacy tools need not
only to inform the users about their privacy levels, but through them
raise awareness, something that can happen by using understandable
concepts to measure privacy and usability friendly techniques such
as visual results. Thus, once users are educated about privacy and
start demanding more privacy-preserving tools in their daily life, pri-
vacy can be incorporated in industrial production pipelines. Hence,
application developers and service providers should also be able to
grasp privacy quantification results and have access to intuitive tools.
Thus, there is also a need for privacy measurement frameworks that
can easily be extended by them according to their needs.
contribution
This thesis focuses on privacy quantification. As already discussed,
privacy is domain dependent and hence, we focus on three domains
selected based on the amount of current or potential data contributors.
Namely, these domains are mobile crowdsourcing (MCS), smart me-
tering, and microdata collection. The domains of MCS and microdata
datasets have millions of data contributors as location and preferences
collection through mobile devices and online services respectively,
are widely deployed. Smart metering is still at an early stage with
experimental projects running on various areas around the world,
however, it might soon be the standard way of electricity measuring
for millions of users. For each of the aforementioned domains, we
collected publicly available data from actual service providers. We
designed privacy metrics and developed tools based on easily under-
standable concepts by users and practitioners. Then, we evaluated
users’ privacy by performing attacks on the collected data. Finally, as
a very important factor of the successful application of any privacy-
protection mechanism is the utility degradation of the data protected,
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we evaluated the privacy-utility trade-off whenever we had access to
the datasets’ utility functions.
Our contributions are as follows:
1. We perform the first in-depth study on location privacy in the
context of MCS. Contrary to the existing paradigm of LBSs,
where users reveal their location seldom to the provider, in the
case under study users upload continuously measurements. In
order to understand the extent of the privacy danger, we perform
various inference attacks (e.g., identifying workplaces, social re-
lationships, and even sensitive information such as religious
views) on the collected data from two representative applica-
tions which make their contributors’ data publicly available on
their websites. Since MCS is a previously unexplored area of lo-
cation privacy, we investigate if and to which extend previously
proposed location privacy-preserving mechanisms (LPPMs) can
be used. To this end, we propose two privacy metrics, based
on statistical measures developed for binary classification and
information retrieval, that capture the privacy gain provided
by the LPPMs with respect to the identification of areas and
points of interest. Furthermore, we also consider new utility
measures that quantify the accuracy of the aggregated values of
data collectively gathered at these locations. Our experimental
evaluation on real data shows that mechanisms based on sharing
only a part of users’ location history do not bring any privacy
benefits to MCS users, essentially because the geo-located data
is in general reported over a long period of time (more than a
day) and contains too many locations. Mechanisms that change
the reported position to a random one close to the original, tend
to provide better privacy but only for strong privacy parameters
that in turn significantly affect the resulting utility. Techniques
that reduce the localization precision though, seem to be the best
suited mechanisms privacy-wise. However, we show that none
of the LPPMs provide an acceptable privacy-utility trade-off for
the MCS applications we study hence, they can not be applied
by practitioners. Finally, we show how the attacks and defenses
of this chapter can be combined in a tool, that we have open-
sourced, in order to enable new research on LPPMs for the MCS
scenario and the design of privacy friendly MCS applications by
developers.
2. Considering the emergence of smart devices in modern house-
holds, we study smart meters as it is the new paradigm for
measuring electrical consumption. More specifically, as smart
metering is a well studied area, we focus on the privacy quantifi-
cation of one of the most prominent privacy protection mecha-
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nisms, that of aggregation. The underlying idea is that if various
energy consumptions profiles, from different users, are aggre-
gated and then reported to the energy provider, individuals are
protected as the distinguishing patterns in their own profiles
will disappear. In this thesis we examine whether aggregated
user consumption data offers such privacy guarantees and how
the size of the aggregate affect the privacy protection. In order
to be able to quantify users’ privacy, we first model privacy as
a cryptographic game, using an indistinguishability notion. In
this game, two single energy load profiles and an aggregated
one are given to an adversary, with the goal of selecting which
of the two profiles is included in the aggregate. The privacy
metric in this case, is how much better an adversary performs
than random guessing. The analysis of the privacy for individual
households for different aggregation sizes, using real energy
consumption data with more than 700 households, shows that
an average household is insufficiently protected in aggregates of
just a few load profiles. On average, an adversary can distinguish
two typical load profiles forming an aggregate with very high
(> 80%) probability, when reporting energy consumption infor-
mation every 15 minutes. Even for larger aggregation sizes, the
adversarial advantage is rather high. Furthermore, we examine
the influence of various parameters, e.g., temporal resolution,
on the detectability of a household within an aggregate. Finally,
we show that single energy-hungry appliances can be detected
in the aggregates of a handful of households with significant
advantage.
3. Finally, considering that users tend to spend significant time on
the Internet and knowingly or not their personal preferences are
collected on a daily basis, we study users’ privacy in microdata
collections. The dangers in the specific scenario are well studied
and it is demonstrated that with minimal information users can
be re-identified in pseudonymized microdata collections [73, 113,
115]. We develop a tool that enables users to approximate their
privacy level, given a set of preferences they want to share with
a service provider, before actually sharing their data. Hence,
users can consciously decide (wrt privacy) whether to share or
not their data. The tool works with published statistics about
a user’s items and hence, does not require access to provider’s
database. We describe the algorithm running in the tool and the
privacy metric that evaluates users’ privacy levels. We evaluate
the effectiveness of our tool using actual datasets from service
providers. Last, aiming to make the tool user friendly, we de-
scribe the benefits of visual results against numerical scores, and
describe the tool’s visual representation.
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outline
Following our contributions in the aforementioned fields, this thesis is
split into three chapters. Chapter 2 is about location privacy in mobile
crowdsourcing. Chapter 3 is about privacy assessment of aggregation
schemes in smart metering. Then, in Chapter 4, we develop a tool for
measuring users privacy levels on microdata collections. We conclude
this thesis in Chapter 5.
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Ethical considerations
This chapter includes experiments with actual user data published
online. For the work on this chapter, we did not collect any personal
data other than that made publicly available by the crowdsourcing
projects we study. During our experiments we have limited our infer-
ences to the minimum to prove the privacy threats posed by public
data sharing. All data reported is aggregated or anonymized such
that no individual’s data is exposed. We have notified the service
providers about our findings, and we have provided them with code
to implement the defenses so that they can take appropriate measures.
At end of this project, all collected and inferred data were deleted. The
code from this section will be made available so that it can be used by
crowdsourcing applications and improved by the research community.
This procedure has been approved by EPFL’s 1 ethics committee.
2.1 mobile crowdsourcing
Crowdsourcing is a participative online activity in which the under-
taking of a task is outsourced to a group of individuals [34]. This new
paradigm of distributing a fragmented task, is an efficient, scalable
business model that allows the cheap (or often free) massive collection
of data. Indicative of the growth of this data collection methods is the
appearance of over 2,000 crowdsourcing platforms[1, 84] in the last
years [146]. Furthermore, according to recent industrial reports [58],
in the last decade 85% of top global brands have already adopted
crowdsourcing, and in 2018 75% of the world’s highest performing
enterprises would use crowdsourcing.
As mobile crowdsourcing (MCS), we refer to a special type of crowd
sourcing where participants collect geo-located data. Similar to other
1 Partner institution in this study.
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applications where users’ data are collected, the goal is to share it
with central servers to attain a particular objective. A straightforward
use case of crowdsourced geo-located data is mapping, e.g., map
generation from volunteered GPS data [2], or map enrichment using
geo-tagged photos [3]. Other applications crowdsource the collection
of diverse geo-located measurements, such as cellular or WiFi signal
quality to localize antennas [4–10], weather data to improve weather
predictions [11], or transportation data for accurate real-time traffic
information [12, 13]. Other geo-located crowdsourcing applications
pursue improving citizens’ experience. For instance, in Kamino [14]
users publish their favorite routes, and in Stereopublic [15] they report
quiet places.
As of 2018, OpenStreetMaps [2], a map generation project from
contributed GPS points, reports 4.3 million users,2 with 1 million
active map editors contributing over 4 billion GPS points. Similarly,
OpenSignal [8], a popular network-measuring application, reports
over 20 million users.3 Safecast [16], a citizen science project collecting
environmental data, currently reports over 75 million measurements
from approximately three thousand users. Many other applications
are available [3–15], and the ecosystem is growing due to the appear-
ance of platforms aimed at easing the development of crowdsourcing
applications [1, 84]. Large IT companies such as Google [17], Microsoft
[18] and Mozilla [6] are also beginning to rely on crowdsourcing, e.g.,
collecting data from billions of users’ devices to build WiFi location
databases.
Crowdsourcing data collection also enables the provision of scien-
tific or humanitarian services that otherwise would be unattainable
due to high cost or lack of sentiment. An example is the Safecast
project that provides real-time and historical radiation measurements
around the world, valuable for many scientific disciplines and pub-
lic health. Additionally, many of these projects offer an open-source,
free alternative to commercial services. For instance, OpenStreetMaps
maps can be used and edited by anyone as an alternative to Google or
Apple maps.
MCS can bring great benefits for organizations and society. However,
the collection and sharing of geo-located data raises serious privacy
concerns. It is known that location data can be used to identify points
of interests (POIs) [74, 77, 97], infer users whereabouts and preferences,
or de-anonymize anonymous traces [157]. This risk increases when
considering auxiliary publicly available information [36, 93, 119], and
persists even when protections are put in place [129, 130]. Recent
scandals related to the publication of data by fitness applications [19,
20] or irresponsible data analysis by transportation companies [21]
exemplify the potential impact of these threats.
2 https://wiki.openstreetmap.org/wiki/Stats
3 https://opensignal.com/methodology#over-20-million-users-of-our-app
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Over the last decade the research community has proposed a vast
number of location privacy-preserving mechanisms (LPPMs) to ad-
dress these issues [128], and can even provide strong differentially
private guarantees [33, 45, 70] and even offer optimal utility [44, 122].
Even though it seems like the location privacy question is technically
solved, the reality is that these LPPMs solely focus on one use case. They
are generally geared towards location-based services (LBSs) in which
whenever users need a service, they reveal their location to a provider
(e.g., to find nearby restaurants). In this context utility is user-centric
and hinges on the precision of the reported locations. In MCS applica-
tions, on the contrary, geo-located data is often shared continuously
and over long periods and, while the data utility is still correlated
with the location precision, it is foremost tied to the values of the
measurements reported at these locations (e.g., WiFi signal strength,
or radiation level). Moreover, MCS utility cannot be captured with a
user-centric approach as, by definition, MCS benefits from aggregating
data collected by a large amount of users.
Chapter outline
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. We first discuss related
work in the field of location privacy in Section 2.2. We subsequently
introduce the three datasets used throughout this chapter in Section
2.3. Then, in Section 2.4 we validate the privacy threat of publishing
raw continuous location data. Section 2.5 describes the LPPMs tested
and the privacy and utility metrics. In Section 2.6 we present the
experimental results while in Section 2.7 we discuss how the this
chapter’s results and code can be used to enable new research on
privacy preserving MCS, and best practices for developers.
2.2 related work
We now present related work regarding the uniqueness of users’
trajectories, ways to extract points of interest from trajectories, location
privacy attacks, defenses and privacy quantification. We refer the
reader to the following surveys for further information about the
security and privacy landscape of location data [79, 98, 128, 148].
2.2.1 POIs and the uniqueness of human mobility
Given a collection of a user’s location reports, one is able to infer
where this person frequents. We present some of the most widely used
strategies for POIs extraction in the next paragraph. Furthermore, we
discuss various works that illustrate why human mobility can be used
as identifier.
12 privacy in mobile crowdsourcing applications
2.2.1.1 Extracting POIs
Extracting users’ POIs, from a collection of location data, is a first step
for enabling various other attacks. Traditionally, POIs are extracted
using machine learning techniques, a paradigm we also follow in
this chapter. Cho [50] used machine learning to infer users’ POIs
and predict their next destination. For the POIs extraction relied on
clustering techniques and decision trees while for the prediction part
on Markov models. Hoh et al. [87] aimed to enhance security and
privacy in traffic-monitoring systems. As part of their work they
conducted a case study to infer users’ home addresses from collected
geo-located data. They relied on the K-means algorithm to create
clusters and then using heuristics they were able to detect individuals’
home locations. Urner et al. [151] studied the effects of various input
features to machine learning algorithms for next place prediction. In
order to extract the places a user stayed for a least a certain duration,
i.e., their POIs, they also used K-means clustering.
2.2.1.2 Uniqueness of human mobility
Several studies have examined individuals’ trajectories and their
uniqueness. Gonzalez et al. [80] studied anonymized mobile phone
data. They explored the statistical properties of the population’s mobil-
ity patterns such as the distance between consecutive calls or returning
to a specific place. Their results indicate that human trajectories have
a high degree of temporal and spatial regularity. Similarly, studying
anonymized phone data, Song et al. [142] explored to which degree
human mobility is predictable. Their results highlight that individual’s
trajectories are predictable despite of the distance users cover. In other
words, an individual’s location data history is a unique identifier.
In the same direction, de Montjoye et al. [57] investigated how the
uniqueness of mobility traces decays depending on their resolution.
They show that uniqueness cannot be avoided by lowering the resolu-
tion of a dataset. Zang et al. [157] analyzed call records from millions
of users in the US where they extracted users’ top POIs. Their results
illustrate that anonymization of location data does not work as the
top-N POIs per user have very small anonymity sets.
2.2.2 Privacy mechanisms
A commonly used privacy-preserving mechanism is the perturba-
tion of the actual location with noise. The state of the art in spatial
obfuscation is geo-indistinguishability [33]. This mechanism adapts
differential privacy notions to location data, offering privacy guaran-
tees independent from the adversary’s prior information. It is known
however that the application of independent noise to continuous re-
leases of correlated locations leads to privacy loss. Chatzikokolakis
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et al. [45] tackled this problem by proposing a more efficient mech-
anism. Their proposed mechanism examines if continuous releases
of locations are correlated and decides whether new noise should be
applied to the releases. In order to enhance the utility of the perturbed
locations, Chatzikokolakis et al. [44] proposed a mechanism called
optimal remapping. Based on prior information about users’ locations,
the newly reported locations are being re-mapped to places that offer
the same privacy guarantees but higher utility. This remapping takes
into account both the prior probability of all nearby locations as well
as, the distance from the perturbed location.
Hoh et al. [88] proposed a LPPM based on hiding locations. The
algorithm uses information from all users in the system to decide
if individual locations should be revealed. Furthermore, the system
uses a novel time-to-confusion privacy metric, specifying how long an
individual can be tracked. Huang et al. [89] developed a scheme to
both maintain quality of service, defined by the provider, and privacy.
In their system, users’ mobile devices have two states, one in which
they maintain a communication identifier when transmitting data and
one that is silent. They exploit the time in between switching rounds,
and hence communication identifiers, to provide privacy by breaking
the link between previous and current identifier.
Generalization techniques have been proposed in the context of
location privacy. Bamba et al. [37] developed a framework for anony-
mous location-based queries to LBS providers. Their system operates
on a discretized map and users can specify their desired privacy
level (defined by k-anonymity or l-diversity) and the temporal and
spatial resolution. The framework then receives users’ requests, fur-
ther anonymizes them and then forwards them to the cooperating
LBS providers, which need to have a part of the system installed on
their side. Gruteser and Grunwald [83] also developed a centralized
framework for location privacy. The underlying idea is that a desired
degree of anonymity, measured by k-anonymity, can be achieved by
generalizing reported location, as the reported wider area will include
further k-1 users.
Generative models, from actual user data, have also been proposed
as LPPMs. Chen et al. [47] explored the use of differentially private
N-grams, i.e. a probabilistic model from sequential items for next
item prediction. Their generative model takes as input actual sequen-
tial user data. Then, creates a differentially private variable N-gram
model by adaptively adding noise to the model’s levels. Acs et al. [29]
explored privacy preserving spatio-temporal density releases. Using
actual user trajectories they keep a sample of locations per user and
then they perturb the time series to preserve privacy. Finally, they re-
leased privacy-preserving statistics for the city of Paris. Bindschaedler
and Shokri [41] proposed a generative model for creating synthetic
locations. Their model extracts geographic and semantic information
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from actual traces in order to achieve low utility loss. Furthermore,
the privacy of trajectories is maintained as the original seeds that
generate the traces have been crafted in such a way that maintain
users’ indistinguishability.
2.2.3 Attacks on geo-located data
Various attacks in the literature have highlighted the danger of sharing
raw geo-located data. Krumm [98] studied collected location data from
volunteers. Using heuristics and clustering techniques he was able
to retrieve a large amount of subjects’ home addresses. Furthermore,
by reverse geo-coding those addresses, he was able to retrieve some
of the subjects names. Using three defenses, spatial cloaking, simple
noise addition (not geo-indistinguishability) and generalization he
further explored how much obscuration is required to maintain users’
privacy. Freudiger et al. [74] analyzed the privacy threat by LBSs.
They identified various ways that individuals share location data
with providers and several attacks (e.g., identification of work/home
locations, extract POIS etc.) that the provider can carry out on the
data. Their experimental results highlight that even when users share
a small amount of location data, they can be uniquely identified.
Gambs et al. [77] explored the re-identification risks in location data.
Using clustering techniques they extracted each users’ POIs, from a
set of raw location data, and used them as states for Markov models.
Furthermore, they also calculated the probability of transiting from
one state to another. Then, they were able to build de-anonymizers for
anonymous datasets. Similarly, using hidden Markov models, Mathew
et al. [112] show how an adversary, by having access to geo-located
data, can predict users’ future movements.
Besides the geo-located data someone shares, auxiliary sources
of data can de-anonymize individuals or enable inference attacks.
Khazbak and Cao [93] explored if co-location information can de-
anonymize mobility traces. Using two location datasets, they devel-
oped models based on maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) and
hidden Markov models to infer users’ past locations in anonymized
datasets, based on available information from other co-located people.
Backes et al. [77] studied whether location data can reveal social rela-
tionships. Using machine learning they show that individuals’ traces
are more similar to those within their social circles than strangers.
Furthermore, they explored if and to what extend various counter-
measures can be applied to mitigate such inference attacks.
In the front of countering proposed location privacy defenses, Pyrge-
lis et al. [130] evaluated the effectiveness of aggregation in geo-located
data. Using a game-based privacy metric (similar to the one we pro-
pose in Chapter 3) over real user data, they investigated both the
effectiveness on raw and differentially private datasets. Their work
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highlights that aggregation does not offer strong privacy guarantees.
Moreover they studied various parameters affecting the privacy of
the aggregate such as density of observations or timing. Last, they
show that large amount of noise could be introduced to protect users’
privacy in the aggregate however this has detrimental results on the
utility of the data. Xu et al.[156], also focusing on aggregation, show
that an adversary can reconstruct individuals’ trajectories using only
the aggregated data. They developed an unsupervised framework that
exploits the uniqueness of human trajectories for different parts of the
day and achieved up to 91% recovery accuracy in their experimental
results over actual user data.
2.2.4 Privacy quantification
Shokri et al. [139] proposed a framework for evaluating LPPMs and a
novel privacy metric based on distortion. This measure captures the
adversary’s correctness regarding users’ original traces when LPPMs
are in place. Shokri et al. [140] also developed a framework to quan-
tify location privacy. The platform supports well known attacks and
defenses and privacy is defined as the adversarial correctness. Oya
et al. [122] studied the design of optimal LPPMs. Their results illustrate
that even if mechanisms are optimized over the expected adversarial
error, there are aspects of privacy that are not taken into account.
Hence, they proposed the use of conditional entropy and worst-case
loss as auxiliary privacy measures.
Our contribution
Contrary to previous works, in this chapter we propose a framework to
quantify privacy in the context of mobile crowdsourcing. In our anal-
ysis, we test the effectiveness of the geo-indistinguishability defense,
and two of its variants. Moreover, we test location hiding techniques
and a generalization method. Similar to previous work, we use an
automated way to extract users’ POIs and hence, infer sensitive in-
formation about them. However, the proposed privacy metrics are
novel, easily understood by developers and users, and are better suited
to the crowdsourcing scenario where users release streams of their
location data. Finally, we rely on realistic utility functions to evaluate
the privacy-utility trade off in the datasets under study.
2.3 mcs applications under study
In this section, we introduce the two crowdsourcing applications stud-
ied in detail in this chapter. In Section 2.4.2 we also briefly investigate
OpenStreetMaps [2] to assess the generalizability of our results.
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2.3.1 Safecast
Safecast [16] is an international, volunteer-centered, organization
whose goal is to monitor the global radiation levels and detect ab-
normalities in near real time. Safecast crowdsources the collection of
radiation data. It provides users with open hardware devices that col-
lect radiation measurements every 5 seconds. The measurements are
published in three ways: (i) as raw measurements available through
an API, (ii) as curated measurements available as a bulk download
and (iii) visualized as an interactive map.
2.3.1.1 Safecast API dataset
Safecast provides an API to access raw radiation measurements. Radi-
ation measurements contain the user’s name, a unique user ID, the
device’s ID, latitude and longitude, a UTC timestamp, and the radi-
ation value and units. No registration is required to access this data
and Safecast’s privacy policy reads4: “All data collected by Safecast
is released under a CC0 public domain designation. Anyone is free
to use with no licensing restrictions. We have done this to enable the
most flexibility in it’s use by others”.
Using this API we retrieved data for all users who had at least
30 measurements. We obtained almost 64 million measurements col-
lected between 2011 and 2017, from 551 users. Many users provide
their actual name (often including their surname) or use identifying
nicknames, and some add metadata to the measurements explaining
the purpose of the trip in which the data were collected. Before using
this dataset in our study, we dropped all entries in which the latitude,
longitude, timestamp or the username were empty. We also removed
data uploaded by several users belonging to one organization under
a unique ID (e.g., corporations or universities), and we converted all
UTC times to the local time determined by the measurement’s coordi-
nates. After this process, the dataset has 52.8 million measurements
from 539 users.
2.3.1.2 Safecast curated dataset
This dataset, available as a bulk download, is the source of Safe-
cast’s interactive map. The curation steps, involving sanity filters and
manually-maintained exceptions, are explained on Safecast’s web-
site.5 It contains 64.2 million measurements from 608 users, collected
from 2011 to 2017. We removed IDs corresponding to organizations,
malformed entries, and converted all UTC times to local. After this
process, the dataset has almost 56.7 million measurements from 537
users (534 of which also appear in the API dataset).
4 https://blog.safecast.org/faq/licenses/
5 https://safecast.org/tilemap/methodology.html
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2.3.1.3 Safecast utility
The Safecast project uses the collected data to study different phenom-
ena related to radiation. We consider two of the possible uses of the
data.
First, we consider the visualization of radiation on the interactive
map. Safecast computes the visualized radiation levels from the crowd-
sourced measurements. For a given region of interest, the map values
are obtained as follows. First, Safecast filters the measurements within
the region and computes the average radiation at each location over
the last 270 days. Second, they discretize the area to 2.25 million grid
points (1500 discrete locations per axis). The displayed map is cre-
ated using nearest-neighbor interpolation on the points of the grid
using the averaged radiation measurements. The reported radiation is
measured in counts per minute (cpm), expressing how many ionized
particles are detected per minute by a monitoring instrument. This
use case represents a scenario in which the measurements process-
ing required to obtain the goal (the interactive map) is in principle
amenable to noise.
A second case of interest, related to Safecast’s concern about public
safety, is the detection of ’hotspots’ – specific areas where radiation
is above a pre-defined threshold. These ’hotspots’ indicate locations
where radiation could be harmful. Once identified, Safecast might
send experts to perform on-site examination to better understand the
causes and consequences of such dangerous measurements. Therefore,
it is important that the localization of hotspots is rather exact in spatial
terms.
2.3.2 Radiocells
Radiocells [5] is an open-source community project whose goal is
to provide an open-source alternative to commercial, closed source,
network geo-location databases. Additionally, they aim to provide raw
data on telecommunication infrastructure that can be use for diverse
experiments. Radiocells crowdsources the collection of measurements
via a mobile application called ‘Radiobeacon’.6 This application al-
lows users to take continuous measurements as they perform daily
activities. Users can choose when to start measuring and when to
stop, and when to upload the measurements to the Radiocells server.
Furthermore, they can select a specific area where measurements will
not be recorded, e.g., to protect their home locations from appearing
in the dataset. However, previous work shows that this kind of defense
is rather fragile [86].
6 https://f-droid.org/packages/org.openbmap/
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2.3.2.1 Radiocells dataset
The raw data uploaded to the server is publicly available for download.
The data is licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike
3.0 Unported and ODbL licences aimed at not restricting the use of
the data.7 Amongst other information, measurements include: signal
strength, cell (antenna) ID, location, timestamp, and smartphone’s
model, software, OS version, and manufacturer. Contrary to Safecast,
this dataset does not contain usernames in an effort to preserve users’
privacy. However, the combination of the smartphone characteristics,
the location, and the network provider is likely to represent a quasi-
identifier. We downloaded data for 2013 to 2017, obtaining 25 million
measurements. To separate users, we grouped the measurements ac-
cording to phone manufacturer, phone model, country and network
operator. We dropped cases where we observed a tuple (country, man-
ufacturer, model, operator) with multiple revisions of the operating
system, as we cannot distinguish OS up/down-grading by a user from
multiple users with a different configuration. We obtained 998 poten-
tial unique users, of which we only kept those that had more than
100 measurements. We inspected the remaining measurements for
spatial inconsistencies. To this end, we calculated the required speed
to travel between contiguous measurements. We removed users whose
maximum speed was more that 200 km/h (i.e., faster than a train). The
final dataset contains 568 users and about 4 million measurements.
2.3.2.2 Radiocells utility
The Radiocells database, amongst other purposes, can be used for
antenna or device geolocation. Contrary to Safecast, Radiocells does
not provide explanations or code as to how they produce their map of
antennas. Thus, we use the location function described by OpenCellID
[4], another crowdsourcing project aimed at geo-locating antennas.
This function defines the location of an antenna as the average of
the latitudes and longitudes of the measurements referring to this
antenna. Such results are useful to enable scientific studies about
the signal quality in specific places and the distribution of antennas.
Furthermore, the Radiocells database can be used (online or offline)
for device geolocation [22]. Users can query either a local instance
of the database or Radiocell’s online service to find their coordinates
based on the nearest antenna and their device’s signal strength.
2.4 privacy risks in current mcs applications
In this section, we assess the privacy risks associated to existing crowd-
sourcing applications data publication approaches using well-known
inference techniques. We study both Safecast and OpenStreetMaps,
7 https://radiocells.org/license
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Table 2.1: Safecast API dataset statistics.
Measurements Users Avg measurements Distinct days
<10k 213 3331 5
10k-100k 230 38341 20
100k-1M 87 270,387 105
>1M 10 1,958,760 632
since they provide identifiable information about their users, enabling
us to validate our inferences against information available in other
online platforms. We do not perform any attacks on the Radiocells
dataset, as it did not include users’ actual names and hence, we were
not able able to collect ground truth. However, this by no means
indicates that users are sufficiently protected. It is known that if
anonymized or pseudonimized datasets are correlated with auxiliary
sources of information, then they can be de-anonymized [113, 115] (we
elaborate on this issue in Chapter 4). We stress that our exploration
barely scratches the surface of what can be learned from the published
data. A determined adversary with enough resources could exploit the
published data sources to infer much more information about users.
2.4.1 Safecast
We evaluate privacy risks for Safecast users on the Safecast API dataset
(see Section 2.3.1). This dataset contains usernames and raw geo-
located measurements. We split the users in the dataset into four
groups according to the amount of reported measurements they have.
For each group, Table 2.1 shows the number of users, their average
amount of measurements, and the average number of days in which
they took at least one measurement. From each group we select the 10
users with the most measurements that provide their real names as
targets for inference. Since in the group with the most measurements
there are only 4 users with real names, we end up with 34 target users.
This allows us to manually validate our inferences in reasonable time.
2.4.1.1 Identifying POIs
Inspired by previous works which show that clustering is a neces-
sary step to extract POIs [50, 69, 74, 87, 97, 112, 151] we rely on the
density-based clustering algorithm (DBSCAN) [69] to find work places.
Contrary to other clustering algorithms (such as K-Means), DBSCAN
is robust to noise and outliers and does not require to specify the num-
ber of clusters a priori. The algorithm receives as input all locations
(also referred to as points) reported by a user, the minimum required
amount of points per cluster, and the maximum allowed distance
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between the cluster’s points. DBSCAN starts by randomly selecting
a point c. Then, it finds all points p that are in distance  from this
point. Then, from the points p reachable from the first point, it tries to
find more points q where q are reachable directly from p but not from
c. If at the end of this procedure the minimum points have not been
reached, it moves to another random point and starts all over again.
In order to use the reported locations which are in tuples of latitudes
and longitudes, we converted all distances to radians first. Moreover,
we used a ball tree data structure to speed up the neighbors queries.
The algorithm outputs a label for every location, indicating to which
cluster it belongs, or if it has been labeled as noise.
2.4.1.2 Identifying workplaces
We run DBSCAN on every users’ measurements during working hours
(Monday to Friday from 9AM to 5PM), and we keep the five clusters
with the highest number of points.8 In many cases these are rather
large clusters with too many POIs. To ease manual validation we use
X-means clustering [125] to split the large clusters, and consider as
POI the centroid of the two largest subclusters. We end up with at
most 10 POIs per user. We use the MapQuest API [23] to obtain these
locations’ addresses and, if existing, the names of businesses at those
coordinates. Note that we could have collected all POIs in the clusters
(such as corporations, parks, restaurants etc.) and filtered out those
not related to workplaces (manually or automatically).
The size of the clusters depends on how DBSCAN is configured. We
consider two parameter settings: a tight configuration that attempts to
collect strong evidence of a POI before proceeding to manual check,
and a loose configuration which provides more candidates but many
false positives to be filtered manually. The tight configuration requires
that there are many points in a cluster (at least 75), that these points
are very close (30 meters, roughly the size of a small building), and
that the user spends significant time there (at least 30 minutes per
day with measurements) to avoid false positives related to commuting
patterns. The loose configuration does not consider the 30-minutes
constraint and relaxes the number and distance between points in an
adaptive manner. Starting from 80 points separated by 60 meters, if
no clusters are found we increase the distance by 30 meters (up to 120
meters maximum) and decrease the number of points by 15 (down to
35 points).
Using the tight configuration, we recover and validate the workplace
in 7 cases out of the 34 (21% recovery rate). The loose configuration can
reach a recovery rate of 35%. For validation we relied on professional
social networks such as LinkedIn or the users’ personal webpages.
For 9 non-validated cases the users did not have a page or had too
8 Throughout this chapter we use the terms points and locations interchangeably.
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common names to find their correct information. We consider the
results for these users not to be necessarily wrong but inconclusive.
If we look at the different users’ groups, in the loose configuration
we find the workplaces for 40% of the users with less than 10k mea-
surements, 20% of the users with 10k-100k measurements, 50% of the
users with 100k-1M measurements, and 25% of the users with more
than 1M measurements. This shows that, surprisingly, the amount of
shared data does not seem to be correlated to the privacy risk. On the
contrary, it seems to be highly dependent on the collection patterns
of the users. Generally, we observe that people fall in two categories.
Those who travel to specific places in order to take measurements, and
thus their work/home addresses cannot be inferred, and those who
measure radiation in the area they live in. The Safecast co-founders,
who are the top contributors in terms of data points, fall in the first
category, explaining the low inference power for users with more than
1M measurements.
Our results confirm recent findings in the literature regarding per-
sonal information inferences from location data[61, 66]. Yet, we want
to stress that the threat may be worse for MCS, due to the volume
of data exposed by participants. For reference, Safecast’s lowest con-
tributing group has on average 3k measurements per user (see Table
2.1) while in the Twitter analysis performed by Drakonakis et al. [61]
only the top contributing users (less than 0.06%) have more than 3k
geolocated tweets. Thus, even if the number of MCS users is not as
large as social networks’ users, we expect a significant fraction of them
to be vulnerable to attacks.
Finally, we note that the results are also limited by our manual
validation effort. If we take all POIs in a cluster as candidates, instead
of taking the centroids, the chances of identifying sensitive POIs
increase, but so does the cost the attack. For instance, using the API
of OpenStreetMaps9 we can see in Figure 2.1 that using the tighter
configuration, we find clusters covering less than 0.5 km2 containing
less than 10 POIs in total, whereas in the looser configuration we find
larger regions containing between 10 and 200 POIs. Larger clusters
contain more POIs to be examined, which increases the possibility of
false positives. Nevertheless, we note that the semantics of locations
often make it easy to filter out false positives, e.g., lakes or parks can
be usually discarded as workplaces.
2.4.1.3 Other POIs
A deep analysis of the times and semantics of the POIs identified by
DBSCAN can reveal other sensitive information about users. Among
others, we could infer two users’ membership to specific organizations:
one member of the Scientology church who reported many points
from the Church of Scientology Celebrity Centre in a major city; and a
9 https://wiki.openstreetmap.org/wiki/Overpass_API
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Figure 2.1: Cluster size and amount of POIs per user. Looser setting – 35%
success (top) and tight setting – 21% success (bottom).
Masonic lodge member who regularly visited the lodge headquarters.
We could verify this information online for both users. Second, we
identified two work-related activities: a US-based scientist working on
a paper regarding radiation around a lake in the Southern part of the
US, and a photographer working in a Japanese city. We validated the
former inference using Research Gate, and the latter on the webpage
of the artist. Finally, we could also follow the education steps of a
European PhD student. Her points of interest over time reveal the
university where she obtained her master’s degree, an exchange with
another European university in the framework of the Erasmus project,
and the university where she is completing her doctoral studies. We
verified these facts on her CV available online.
2.4.1.4 Inferring social links
Knowing from previous work [54, 64] that co-locations can unveil
social links, we examine whether crowdsourced geo-located measure-
ments can also be used for this purpose. We identify pairs of users
with similar latitude, longitude, and time of measurement in the whole
Safecast API dataset. More advanced methods, such as measuring the
amount of time two users are co-located or the number of different
locations where two users jointly report their locations [36, 54, 153],
could further improve our results.
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In total, we identified 50 unique pairs of users with real names (last
and first names) and with at least one co-located instance. Among
them, 16 are real friendship relations according to public information
available on online social networks (Facebook and Twitter), i.e., 32%
correct inferences. Note that, in order to validate a social link, we need
both users in a pair to be part of the same social network, and that
at least one of them publicly reveals her social links. The pairs we
could not validate did not fulfill one of these conditions. We cannot
conclude that these pairs of users are not socially related. In fact, given
the sparsity of the dataset, there is a high likelihood that they know
each other.
2.4.2 OpenStreetMaps
As cross validation of the results in Safecast, we attempt to repeat the
inferences on data collected from OSM. Contrary to Safecast, OSM
does not have an open API for accessing users’ data. Yet, traces from
those users who have chosen to make their data available can be easily
obtained from OSM’s website. To minimize the impact on OSM servers,
and comply with their non-crawling policy, we manually downloaded
data for 30 users with a large amount of contributions10 of which
17 used their actual names (or indicative nicknames). Although the
majority of the points in the dataset were rather old (most of them
at least 7-8 years old), we were able to verify previous workplaces
for 3 of the 17 users (17%). For other users, we found out that they
did not have a standard place of employment during data collection
period (e.g., students). Additionally, for all users, their POIs were
within the area where they worked or lived. We used this fact to infer
two of the users’ short vacation trips which we manually verified with
information publicly accessible from their social media accounts.
2.5 protecting location privacy in mcs
In the previous section we showed that current data sharing practices
of MCS applications put users’ privacy in danger. In this section, we
describe the existing LPPMs that could be put in place to reduce
the privacy risks. These defense mechanisms have been proposed for
the case of LBSs which is fundamentally different from MCS. First,
LBSs aim at fulfilling an individual, user-centric, need related to a
user location (e.g., find nearby restaurants). MCS, aim at fulfilling a
common objective through collaborative measurements. Second, LBSs
often require sparse geo-located data (just few points per geo-located
query) where MCS usually requires continuous collection. Therefore,
it is not straightforward that these LPPMs will work as expected in
the MCS setting.
10 http://resultmaps.neis-one.org/oooc
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2.5.1 Defenses
We consider the following three main LPPMs categories [98, 140]: (i)
spatial obfuscation, (ii) hiding, and (iii) generalization. We do not
consider the use of dummy locations or synthetic data [41, 47], as we
consider these solutions to be inadequate for the MCS setting. These
approaches focus on producing plausible locations, but to the best
of our knowledge there is no proposal that provides the means to
generate measurements (or other values) to be associated to the re-
ported locations while preserving utility in applications such as those
in our study. In fact, we argue that generating fake measurements,
possibly using prior information, is bound to pollute the real-time
measurements that these applications aim at collecting.
2.5.1.1 Spatial obfuscation
As already discussed, the state-of-the-art spatial obfuscation technique
is geo-indistinguishability (GeoInd), and is widely used in the literature
[24, 70, 92, 108, 127, 155]. Following the original definition in [33] we
obfuscate locations by adding planar Laplacian noise. The magnitude
of this noise is controlled by the parameter  = l/r which guarantees
that the ratio between the probabilities of two different locations being
the real location in an area of radius r is at most l.
Release-GeoInd. A known problem when using GeoInd for continuous
reporting is that the level of privacy decreases linearly with the num-
ber of reported locations. To address this limitation we consider a
mechanism that, inspired by the predictive approach proposed in [45],
reports a new noisy location if and only if the user has moved at least
z meters away from his previous location. Otherwise, it repeats the
last reported location. We call this approach “Release-GeoInd”.
GeoInd-OR. It has recently been shown that remapping the obfuscated
locations to the popular ones, according to prior knowledge on users’
movements patterns, can offer optimal utility without reduction in
privacy [44, 122]. We implement Chatzikokolakis et al. [44] remapping
approach to remap GeoInd samples. We refer to this approach as
“GeoInd-OR”.
2.5.1.2 Hiding
This defense achieves privacy by not reporting some of the users’
locations [88, 89]. The released locations are not perturbed. We consider
two hiding strategies: (i) a “Random” strategy in which users release
a random subset of their points, and (ii) a “Release” strategy in which
users only reveal a new point when they have traveled at least xmeters
away from the previously reported location.
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2.5.1.3 Generalization
This defense reduces the precision with which locations are reported [37,
83]. Similarly to Krumm’s discretization mechanism [98], we imple-
ment this approach by reducing the precision of the reported GPS
coordinates. We denote this defense as “Rounding”.
2.5.2 Measuring privacy
Location privacy metrics in the literature are mostly based on a func-
tion of the distance between the real location of the user and the
one inferred by the adversary [139, 140]. This function could be the
Hamming distance when measuring semantic similarity, the Euclidean
distance when quantifying the correctness of the adversary’s inference
[140], or entropy when measuring the uncertainty of the adversary
regarding the user’s location [122]. These privacy metrics are very
well suited for the case of LBSs, where users release one location per
query, and the adversary tries to infer users’ location. However, they
are hard to use in the MCS setting, where the adversary has access
to continuous releases by the user over several days. Thus, it is not
possible to establish between which points should distance be com-
puted, or across which points compute a probability distribution for
entropy-based metrics.
Furthermore, we argue that none of previously proposed metrics
capture privacy in a tangible manner understandable by users and
developers of crowdsourcing applications. How much privacy is an
error of 10 meters or 500 meters? It is clear that one is larger than the
other, but not how much privacy they provide regarding the potential
inference of sensitive information. Even more complicated is the case
of entropy, whose units of measurement – bits, nats, or hartleys – are
rarely known, let alone interpretable, by layman people.
2.5.2.1 Privacy gain
Aiming towards user empowerment (both by users but also application
developers), we propose to quantify privacy as the loss of adversarial
inference power regarding two privacy dimensions understandable by
users: geographical area and POIs. To quantify this loss we use two
well-established statistical measures: precision and recall. The former
captures the case where privacy is increased when, after the defense,
the adversary identifies many false candidate locations along with the
user’s real whereabouts, i.e., the adversary has low precision ( TPTP+FP ,
where TP and FP refer to true positives and false positives, respectively).
The latter captures the case when, after the defense, the adversary
cannot correctly identify the original locations visited by the user, i.e.,
the adversary has low recall ( TPTP+FN , where FN refers to false negatives).
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Spatial privacy gain. Spatial privacy refers to the geographical area in
which the adversary infers the user can be (defined as the union of
the clusters generated via a POIs extraction attack, as in Section 2.4).
We define the true positives (TP) as the area in the intersection of
the clusters’ union before and after the defense is deployed (i.e., the
proportion of the area inferred by the adversary that corresponds to
the user’s real location). Similarly, we define the false positives (FP) to
be the area in the clusters after the defense that does not overlap with
the area before the defense (i.e., the area inferred by the adversary
where the user was not present), and false negatives (FN) as the area
before the defense that does not overlap with the region inferred after
the defense (i.e., the area where the user has been but that is missed
by the adversary).
POI privacy gain. In reality though, the georgraphic area itself may
not fully capture users’ privacy [139]. For instance, if there is only
one point of interest in a large area, privacy should be low. On the
contrary, in small areas with many POIs (e.g., a block in a city), privacy
might be large. To account for this fact we propose a complementary
metric based on POIs. In this case true positives (TP) are the POIs
in the intersection between the clusters before and after the defense
is applied. Similarly, false positives (FP) are POIs identified after the
defense that were not present before, and false negatives (FN) are the
POIs in the original clusters that do not appear after deploying the
defense.
2.5.3 Measuring utility
Besides privacy, one key aspect to decide which LPPM is best for a use
case is the LPPM’s utility loss. We now introduce the utility metrics
used in our evaluation.
2.5.3.1 Distance-based metric
In this chapter, we refer as distance-based metrics those proposed in
the literature for LPPMs in the context of LBSs. In our experiments we
use the per-location distance between original and obfuscated locations
using the haversine distance, nessesary for correctly calculating the
distance between two points on a sphere given their longitudes and
latitudes. The haversine distance is expressed as:
d = 2R arcsin
(√
sin2
(
φ2−φ1
2
)
+ cos(φ1) cos(φ2) sin2
(
λ2 − λ1
2
))
where R denotes the radius of the earth (approximately 6371 km), φ1
and φ2 the latitudes of the first and second point respectively while
λ1 and λ2 the longitudes of the two points. We note that, when utility
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Table 2.2: Safecast (top) and Radiocells (bottom) measurements per region.
Vulnerable users are those with at least one cluster.
Region Users Meas/ments
Average Standard Vulnerable
per user deviation users
Tokyo 30 2,701,367 90,046 203,576 24 (80%)
Fukushima 104 7,765,773 74,671 260,671 65 (62%)
World 537 56,655,768 105,504 70,954 349 (65%)
World 568 3,710,547 6,532 17,312 91 (16%)
is measured as the expected distance, then it can be seen as the dual of
privacy, i.e., the further from the real location the obfuscated location
is, the more difficult is the inference but also the more utility is lost.
2.5.3.2 Aggregate statistics
In the case of MCS, the utility is inherently collective as it depends
on multiple users’ measurements. Indeed, most MCS providers are
interested in aggregate statistics computed over individuals’ contri-
butions. This is the case for both Safecast, to obtain the radiation
map, and Radiocells, to obtain the coordinates of the antennas. Both
are derived from average measurements of MCS users. Hence, we
consider a second utility metric that is not a distance, but a function
of the values of interest for the MCS provider using the actual utility
functions of the projects (as described in Section 2.3).
2.6 existing lppms performance in mcs scenarios
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the existing LPPMs
in terms of privacy gain and their impact on the utility of the MCS
applications we study.
2.6.1 Experimental setup
We run the experiments on all the data available from Safecast and
Radiocells. To understand the impact on utility, for Safecast we also
consider two regions in Japan with very different radiation profiles:
Tokyo, where the radiation profile is quite uniform, and Fukushima,
where the nuclear incident at the Daiichi power plant [25] in 2011
created areas with elevated radiation.
Table 2.2 summarizes the statistics (number of users, total amount
of measurements, and measurements per user) of the regions under
study. We report the percentage of users vulnerable to our attacks
before the defenses are applied, i.e., the percentage of users for which
we can find at least one cluster. For Safecast-Tokyo we only report the
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statistics of the 30 users considered for protection by the GeoInd-OR
(see below).
For a given LPPM we evaluate privacy gain and utility loss as
follows:
Step 1. We first obtain clusters for all users in the region of interest from
the raw data. We use the tight configuration described in Section 2.4.
To identify the POIs, instead of considering just the centroids we use
the OSM API to collect all POIs within the union of clusters of the targeted
user.
Step 2. We apply the LPPM to all users’ data and obtain the clusters
and POIs from the obfuscated data as in Step 1. Note that when
Rounding to 2 or 3 digits, obfuscated locations are separated by ap-
proximately 1,100 meters and 110 meters, respectively. In this case
the tight clustering parameters with a maximum distance between
points of 30 meters will not find any clusters, and increasing this
distance would result in too large uninformative clusters. However,
the operation of Rounding guarantees that given an obfuscated point,
actual location of the user is within a square of size 110, resp. 1,100
meters, centered in the reported location. Thus, for this case instead
of using DBSCAN clusters, we pick the squares around the five most
frequently reported obfuscated locations.
Step 3. We measure the privacy gain as described in Section 2.5.2. For
the Spatial privacy gain, we compare the area (in square kilometers)
of the clusters before and after the LPPM, while for the POI privacy
gain compare the number of POIs within the clusters.
Step 4. We measure the utility loss as described in Section 2.5.3. In
the case of aggregate statistics the utility is application dependent.
For Safecast, we consider as utility loss the difference between the
radiation values on the application’s interactive map (see Section 2.3.1)
before and after the LPPM. We consider the absolute difference in cpm
per grid point. In Radiocells, we consider as utility loss the distance
between the location of the antennas before and after the LPPM.
2.6.2 Defenses implementation
For the GeoInd defense, we set the privacy parameter l = ln(1.6), and
use a radius of r ∈ {50, 150, 300} meters, which yields  ∈ {0.01, 0.003, 0.001}.
The noise is drawn by first transforming the location to polar coordi-
nates. Then, the angle is drawn randomly between 0 and 2pi while the
distance is drawn from
C−1(ρ) = −
1

(W−1(
ρ− 1
e
) + 1)
with W−1 denoting the −1 branch of the Lambert W function [53].
Finally, the generated distance and angle are added to the original
location. Figure 2.2 present the CDF of the noise added on all GeoInd
2.6 existing lppms performance in mcs scenarios 29
Figure 2.2: GeoInd noise magnitude for different radius (l = ln(1.6)).
variants (Optimal Remapping and Release-GeoInd). The noise is con-
trolled by either the radius (r) or the privacy parameter (l). For the
Release-GeoInd mechanism, we use l = ln(1.6), r = 50 meters, and
we select the distance between released locations to be z ∈ {30, 60, 90}
meters. Remapping the locations for the LPPM GeoInd-OR requires
computing the posterior probability for every candidate location. This
operation is rather costly when the number of locations being con-
sidered grows. To keep a reasonable experimentation time, we only
test GeoInd-OR for the Tokyo region in the Safecast dataset. We use
80% of the users to construct the prior probability distribution de-
scribing users’ movements, and the remaining 20% to evaluate the
effectiveness of the approach. We chose this 20% manually to keep
a balanced testing set. It is composed of the top 10 users with many
(more than 50k), moderate (between 10k and 50k), and few (less than
10k) measurements.
Optimal Remapping. For the optimal remapping technique we follow
these steps; For performance reasons, we first round each location
to 3 digits, in order to merge nearby locations together. Then, we
calculate the probability of each coordinate. Afterwards, we convert all
coordinates to a Cartesian system using their distance from the center
of the Earth. A useful tutorial on this can be found in [26]. Using the
Cartesian coordinates we build a KD-Tree for efficient nearest neighbor
calculations. Then, for every location where GeoInd has been applied,
we query all nearest neighbors in a region r ′. This r ′ is set to be as
the 99th percentile of the distribution that generated the parameter
r used in GeoInd. In other words, the user has 99% chance of being
remapped somewhere within this distance. For all neighboring points,
we compute the posterior and then, we calculate the geometric median
of those coordinates using the iterative Weiszfeld’s algorithm [52].
The geometric median minimizes the average Euclidean distance and
hence, returning the new, optimal (in terms of utility as privacy should
remain the same) location.
We implement the Random mechanism tossing a biased coin every
time a location is about to be reported. The bias is set so that users
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release on average 40%, 60% or 80% of their measurements. For the
Release mechanism, we sort all the locations reported by a user in
chronogical order, and release a new location only if it is separated
by (at least) x ∈ {30, 60, 90} meters from the previously reported one.
If two locations are less than x meters apart but in different days, we
release them both.
Last, we implement Rounding by rounding to 2, 3, or 4 decimals
of the latitude and longitude of the users’ locations. Effectively, this
reduces the location accuracy to roughly 1,100 meters, 110 meters and
11 meters, respectively.
Figure 2.3: Safecast privacy gain: Spatial (left) and POIs (right). Amount of
measurements per user + : <10k, : [10k,50k], N : >50k. Each
point on the graphs represents one user.
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2.6.3 Privacy gain
2.6.3.1 Safecast
We first evaluate the privacy gain of the LPPMs in the Safecast dataset.
Figure 2.3 shows the Spatial (top) and POI (bottom) gain for Tokyo,
Fukushima, and the whole world. The x-axis represents precision, and
the y-axis recall. Each point in the graph represents a user, and the
markers’ shape indicate the amount of measurements she contributes.
The colors represent the LPPMs. Defenses that provide large gains
result on points close to the figure axes. Points near the y-axis indicate
low precision, i.e., cases in which the adversary correctly identifies
some (or even all) of the true locations but also inferred many other
wrong locations. Points near the x-axis indicate low recall, i.e., cases
in which the adversary correctly identifies some real locations, but
misses many others. Unsurprisingly, we observe a high variance in
the defenses’ performance since it is highly dependent on the user
behavior. However, it is possible to identify some trends.
We first discuss the Spatial privacy gain (Figure 2.3, left). For GeoInd
we observe that, for the least privacy-preserving parameter (r = 50m),
it significantly decreases the number of vulnerable users (grey points
in the figure) from the values reported in Table 2.2. The reduction is
50% for Tokyo (from 24 vulnerable users to 12), 45% for Fukushima,
and 45% for the whole world. When the mechanism is strengthened
(r = 300m), GeoInd adds so much noise (Figure 2.2 for reference) that
no users are vulnerable after the defense. In summary, GeoInd seems
to provide fairly good privacy gain in Tokyo and Fukushima. Yet,
from the whole dataset, it becomes clear that the protection provided
by GeoInd is highly dependent on the users’ movement patterns.
Moreover, we show in Section 2.6.4 that this protection comes with
significant utility loss.
The Release-GeoInd (yellow) mechanism works generally better
than GeoInd. Even though more users are vulnerable (only between
4% and 13% of the users become not-vulnerable) and the adversary
obtains reasonable precision, it yields very low recall. This is because
in this method users keep reporting the same obfuscated location
until they move. This repetition results in clusters being found on
fake locations that often do not overlap with the original ones. This
reduction becomes more significant as the defense is configured to
provide more privacy (larger z).
GeoInd-OR performs slightly better than vanilla GeoInd. This is
because the remapping results on points being repeatedly mapped
to popular places causing generation of clusters around those not-
real locations. Interestingly, even though this defense was designed
to improve utility while keeping the same privacy guarantees, we
observe that it decreases utility in the MCS setting (see Section 2.6.4.1).
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Similar to vanilla GeoInd, the Release mechanism (blue) significantly
reduces the number of vulnerable users – by more than 50% even
for the least conservative parameter. However, when precision is very
high, i.e., when a cluster is found it corresponds to a real location. The
reason is that even though the user hides many point, if a location is
visited regularly the user will eventually report enough points around
this location to make the cluster identifiable by the adversary.
The Random hiding mechanism (green) does not perform well. First,
it reduces the number of vulnerable users less than other defenses (10%
decrease in Tokyo, 27% in Fukushima, and only 5% when considering
the whole world). From the vulnerable users only a handful obtain
good protection. We could not find a clear pattern to predict which
movement profiles would best benefit from this defense. For many
users, especially those with a few points, removing points at random
still yields high precision as the few measurements are very localized.
Overall, we do not notice much influence of the fraction of hidden
points on the privacy of the users.
Finally, the protection provided by Rounding (pink) depends on the
rounding parameter. Keeping 4 decimals reduces accuracy by just 11
meters. Therefore, the adversary finds roughly the same clusters, i.e.,
for many users we observe high recall and precision after the defense
(especially in Tokyo and Fukushima). On the contrary, rounding to 2
or 3 decimals significantly increases the size of inferred spatial areas,
which leads to variable recall (depending on the users’ movement
patterns) and low precision, but at the same time hurts the utility.
Regarding the POI privacy gain (Figure 2.3, right), a first observation
is that the amount of users vulnerable to the attack, i.e., points in the
graph, is lower. This is because for many users the identified clusters
do not contain any POI (according to the OSM API, there could be
POIs in reality). Second, for the users who have POIs in their clusters,
both recall and precision are higher than in the Spatial gain. This is
because many of the large clusters that contribute to the low Spatial
precision do not have POIs and thus do not contribute to the confusion
of the adversary when identifying particular locations. Furthermore,
the clusters that the adversary finds after the LPPMs may cover less
area than the original clusters, but still contain most of the users’
initial POIs. This provides a higher POI recall than Spatial recall.
Third, in this case we observe a significant difference between Tokyo
and Fukushima. The reason is twofold. First, the Fukushima prefecture
is much larger than the area of Tokyo we consider. Second, Fukushima
is a more rural area and thus contains fewer POIs than Tokyo, where
even small clusters have many places of interest.
These observations reinforce previous insights that solely consid-
ering the spatial dimension [139] may provide a false perception of
privacy. Considering a POI-privacy measure is necessary for provid-
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Figure 2.4: Precision and recall for different clustering parameters for GeoInd
(r = 50m) in Tokyo. Amount of measurements per user + : <10k,
: [10k,50k], N : >50k.
ing a comprehensive picture of the privacy threat users face in MCS
applications.
Adjusting the clustering parameters. We now study the influence
of the DBSCAN clustering parameters on our results. We show the
difference in precision and recall for GeoInd (r=50 meters) when
we vary both the maximum distance and the minimum number of
point per cluster in Figure 2.4. As we increase the maximum distance
between points and decrease the minimum required points per cluster,
the results concentrate on the upper left corner of the diagram. This
is because as the parameters become ‘looser’, the resulting clusters
grow in size increasing recall (more likelihood of covering all users’
original clusters) but reducing precision due to many false positives.
Furthermore, increasing the cluster size increases the adversary’s cost,
as the clusters contain a larger number of POIs (Figure 2.5) which
requires more filtering and increases the probability of having false
positives.
Impact of the amount of measurements on privacy. We present in
Figure 2.6 the Spatial gain for the three best LPPMs (all parameters
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Figure 2.5: Clusters’ size and amount of POIs per cluster for different clus-
tering parameters with GeoInd (r = 50m) in Tokyo.
combined) split by the amount of measurements users contributed. We
discard Rounding 4 as it does not provide any privacy. We observe that
all LPPMs provide low precision regardless of the users’ contribution
volume. We observe a similar effect for recall except for Rounding
which, as explained above, by definition provides variable recall and
low precision. In Figure 2.7, the POIs gain (for the three best defenses)
validates the results (found in the previous paragraphs) about the
differences between spatial and POIs privacy gain. It is important to
note though, that for one particular group and defense (GeoInd and
users with less that 10K measurements) the results cannot be trusted
as they concern only one user.
Counterintuitively, the LPPMs perform worse for users who con-
tribute fewer points. This is because the attack constructs more, and
larger (on average 10 times bigger), clusters for people who share
many points than for those sharing fewer points. These clusters are
split after the LPPMs are put in place, as some reported locations are
moved away from their original clusters while other measurements,
perturbed with noise, concentrate to new places forming wrong clus-
ters. For Rounding, where every cluster created after the LPPM has
roughly the same size, users with a few measurements have higher
recall because their initial small clusters are often covered by the large
regions resulting from the LPPM.
Thwarting inference attacks. Finally, we evaluate to which extent the
different LPPMs are effective at thwarting the inferences reported
in Section 2.4, using the tight configuration. The LPPMs alter the
users’ reported locations which in turn may result on deviations in
the clusters’ centroids locations. We observe that GeoInd and Release-
GeoInd fully hide all workplaces, and Release-GeoInd with 30m hides
all but one. For Random hiding, we can identify one workplace when
releasing 60% of the locations, and 6 when releasing 80%. The Release
mechanism is very effective as it hides all workplaces regardless of its
parameter. Finally, unsurprisingly, Rounding to 4 decimals does not
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Figure 2.6: Spatial precision (green) and recall (red), depending on the
amount of measurements x per user for three selected defenses
(all parameters combined), for Safecast.
Figure 2.7: POIs precision (green) and recall (red), depending on the amount
of measurements x per user for three selected defenses (all pa-
rameters combined), for Safecast.
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protect against work inference, and Rounding with 3 digits only hides
one workplace out of 7. Rounding 2 protects all users.
Summarizing the Safecast privacy results, it becomes clear that some
defenses do not work while others, such as GeoInd and Rounding can
offer adequate protection with properly tuned parameters. However,
as it is discussed in the forthcoming sections, one has to take the utility
loss into account, when deciding which which parameters to use.
Figure 2.8: Spatial privacy gain (left part) and POI privacy gain (right part)
in Radiocells. Amount of measurements per user + : <10k, :
[10k,50k], N : >50k. Each point on the graphs represents one user.
2.6.3.2 Radiocells
Users in Radiocells have on average fewer measurements than those in
Safecast. Thus, clustering requiring 100 points yields very few clusters.
Hence, for this dataset we loosened the requirement to 25 points per
cluster.
We see in Figure 2.8 that, in terms of Spatial gain, GeoInd-based
mechanisms behave similarly to the Safecast case. Vanilla GeoInd de-
creases the number of vulnerable users by 14%, and Release-GeoInd
by 2%. Given that only 16% of the users are initially vulnerable this
reduction is significant. For the users for which the algorithm finds
clusters, the behaviour is the same: GeoInd provides highly variable
protection, and Release-GeoInd yields low recall while precision de-
pends on the user behavior. For the hiding mechanisms, the Random
and the Release mechanisms decrease the number of vulnerable users
by 7% and 14%, respectively. For the vulnerable users, contrary to
Safecast, these mechanisms consistently yield high precision, i.e., they
offer poor privacy protection for Radiocell’s users movement profiles.
Finally, the Rounding mechanisms with parameters 2 and 3 offer rea-
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Figure 2.9: Spatial precision (green) and recall (red), depending on the
amount of measurements x per user for three selected defenses
(all parameters combined), for Radiocells.
Figure 2.10: POIs precision (green) and recall (red), depending on the amount
of measurements x per user for three selected defenses (all
parameters combined), for Radiocells.
sonable privacy. Regarding POIs, we observe similar behavior than
with the Safecast dataset. For reference, in Figures 2.9 and 2.10 we
represent the impact of measurements on the privacy of the users. The
results confirm the observations made for the Safecast dataset with
the exception that this dataset has less users and they have on average
much less measurements. Hence, for some groups of contributed data
the results are generalized by a small amount of users.
Overall, the results in Radiocells are consistent with our findings
in the Safecast dataset, confirming the trends regarding the LPPMs’
behavior in the MCS setting.
2.6.4 Utility-privacy trade-off
In order to accurately evaluate the effectiveness of LPPMs one also
needs to pay attention to the incurred utility loss, as this is a crucial
factor for the successful adoption of any privacy-preserving methodol-
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Figure 2.11: Measurement error in Tokyo using a distance-based metric. This
can be interpreted either as privacy gain or utility loss.
ogy. As already discussed though, in MCS the utility loss is different
than the more traditional LBSs setting.
2.6.4.1 Safecast
We now study the utility loss for Safecast.
Distance-based metric vs aggregate statistics for MCS. We first eval-
uate the utility loss incurred by the LPPMs measured using the LBSs-
oriented distance-based metric described in Section 2.5.3. Figure 2.11
presents the per-reported location utility loss for users in the Safecast-
Tokyo dataset. The y-axis indicates the distance in meters, and the
x-axis the LPPM and the percentage of points that are released. This
utility metric is based on the distance between reported and real lo-
cation, but disregards the (radiation) values that Safecast cares about.
Random and Release LPPMs seem to be the best, and GeoInd LPPMs
offer the worst performance as they tend to spread measurements,
sometimes more than a kilometer away from the initial measurements
(see Figure 2.2 for reference)
Figures 2.12 and 2.13 show the per grid-point utility loss for Tokyo
and Fukushima, respectively, when the utility loss measured as the
difference between radiation values on the generated map. We ob-
serve a similar behavior in both regions, though the median loss in
Fukushima is slightly higher and it has many more outliers (reaching
up to 104 difference) than in Tokyo. In this case, after the interpolation
all GeoInd variants offer roughly the same utility loss on average.
However, Hiding and Rounding strategies offer better performance,
yielding smaller errors for the least protective parameters.
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Figure 2.12: Absolute difference in Tokyo’s radiation values with Safecast
dataset.
Figure 2.13: Absolute difference in Fukushima’s radiation values with the
Safecast dataset.
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If we compare the distance-based results (Figure 2.11) to the util-
ity loss computed considering the values to appear in Safecast’s in-
teractive map (Figure 2.12) we find significant differences. A first
observation is that, LPPMs based on GeoInd fare the worst in the
distance-bases measure compared to the aggregate statistics. Further-
more, distance-based metrics do not properly quantify the loss of
LPPMs that hide some points (Random and Release). While it is true
that the released points have no error, the many points that do not
appear incur in a loss. This is made evident by the aggregated metrics,
where we observe that the more points are hidden, the larger is the
utility loss. We note that relying on Markov mobility models such as
in [76, 140] could help interpolating the hidden locations. Yet, this
would not help recovering the (radiation) values attached to them
and the utility loss could not be avoided. For non-hiding mechanisms,
distance-base metrics consistently result on larger median loss, though
less variance and less outliers.
In summary, distance-based metrics provide a very different percep-
tion of the LPPM performance than considering utility functions com-
puted on the geo-located values, overestimating the performance of
some methods (e.g., hiding strategies) and underestimating others (e.g.,
GeoInd-based LPPMs). We conclude that traditional LBSs-oriented
metrics are inadequate for measuring utility in MCS scenarios.
Why optimal remapping does not work for MCS. Even though GeoInd-
OR was designed to increase utility while preserving privacy, we
observe that in the MCS case utility roughly stays the same (Figure
2.12), and privacy slightly increases, both in decreasing the number
of vulnerable users and in increasing the spatial gain. The reason for
this mismatch is that this mechanism was designed in the context of
LBSs, where remapping locations to places where the user is likely to
be is bound to provide good utility on average. However, in Safecast
the utility does not depend on the locations themselves, but on the
associated measurements. Remapping the location, however, concen-
trates measurements in these popular locations effectively polluting
the measurements. To illustrate this effect, we show in Figure 2.14 a
heatmap of the prior probability of users’ locations over all locations in
Tokyo. This figure was obtained by rounding every reported location
within the prefecture of Tokyo to 3 decimal digits (for visualization
purposes) and then counting the occurrence of each unique location.
In this way, we have a visual representation of which places attract
the most users and which are rarely visited. We observe that the prob-
ability is low (represented in white) for most places with just a few
exceptions, which are popular locations for users who contributed
lots of measurements (represented in black). Remapping in the low
probability areas has a randomizing effect, since most locations have
the same probability. On the contrary, when remapping happens in a
region with a location with high probability, this popular location con-
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Figure 2.14: Prior probability of visiting locations in Tokyo (white - low
probability, black - high probability).
centrates the remapping. This, while hurting utility increases privacy,
as it creates artificial clusters that reduce the adversary’s precision and
recall.
Semantic interpretation. The absolute difference in cpm of measure-
ments before and after the defense gives a rough idea about the utility
loss, but they are difficult to interpret. Are they significant? What is
the effect of outliers? Does reporting the values after the defense have
any implication on the danger for human health? To answer these
questions, we study how the variance introduced by the defenses can
change the interpretation of the risk at a given location. To this end,
we rely on the cpm safety scale [27] provided with one of the top-seller
Geiger counters (radiation measurement devices) on the market. This
scale contains five categories:
• Category 1: 0-50 cpm. Normal radiation background.
• Category 2: 51-99 cpm. Medium level.
• Category 3: >100 cpm. High level.
• Category 4: >1000 cpm. Very high level, leave area.
• Category 5: >2000 cpm. Extremely high level, immediate evacu-
ation.
We select the prefecture of Fukushima and two defenses that produce
a good level of privacy: GeoInd 300m and Rounding 2. For each of the
2.25 million grid-points on Safecast’s radiation map for Fukushima, we
compute their radiation category according to the safety scale before
and after each defense. For GeoInd 300m, which is of probabilistic
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Table 2.3: Category changes, for each of the radiation danger groups, after
applying Geo-Ind (r = 300 meters) in Fukushima.
Geo-Ind: 300 1 2 3 4 5 Number
Original of points
1 79.7% 19.3% 1% 0.003% 0.001% 1354110
2 41.5% 49.5% 9% 0.023% 0.01% 650486
3 8.7% 35.9% 52.2% 2.3% 0.9% 229848
4 2.5% 3.3% 49.3% 29.8% 15.1% 10489
5 3.9% 1.7% 34.7% 29.3% 30.4% 5067
Table 2.4: Category changes, for each of the radiation danger groups, after
applying the Rounding mechanism (2 decimals) in Fukushima.
Rounding: 2 1 2 3 4 5 Number
Original of points
1 89.3% 10.3% 0.3% - 0.001% 1354110
2 30.2% 64% 5.8% 0.003% - 650486
3 0.7% 22.6% 74.8% 1.6% 0.3% 229847
4 0.2% 0.01% 43.3% 39.6% 16.9% 10490
5 0.9% - 9.3% 42.1% 47.6% 5067
nature, we repeat the procedure 10 times and report the average. We
present the results in Tables 2.3 and 2.4.
We observe that the majority of the points either stay in their original
category or move to a nearby. However, we observe some extreme
category jumps from the first category (safe radiation levels) to the
fourth and fifth (high danger). For instance, GeoInd causes 53 places
to be marked as dangerous instead of safe. Even more alarming, 283
locations that should be marked as extremely dangerous are marked
as safe or slightly elevated (categories 1 and 2). On the contrary, the
Rounding mechanism limits the number of extreme changes. For
instance, there is a category jump from 5 to 1 and 2 only for 45
grid-points.
The case of high precision measurements. One of the reasons why
Safecast collects crowdsourced measurements is the monitoring of
radiation “hotspots” that could be dangerous for public health. When
locating hotspots, precision is important both to understand their
implications and to keep low costs if experts have to be sent to study
the origin of the abnormality.
To understand the impact of LPPMs on hotspot location we perform
detection in Tokyo and Fukushima by looking for locations with more
than 100 cpm radiation after averaging the measurements over the last
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270 days but before interpolating the data. This is to avoid that interpo-
lation modifies the position of the hotspots, or even eliminates them.
We show the results of detection when using the raw measurements,
and after the application of several defenses in Figures 2.15 and 2.16.
We see that noise-based mechanisms spread the measurements
and create additional hotspots and, as the noise increases, so do the
hotspots. This renders the hotspot detection useless for Safecast as
the results cannot be properly interpreted. For instance some hotspots
could originally be in places known to present high radiation, and
hence be already closely monitored by the authorities. The spreading
of the points conveys a much different message, especially when the
hotspots appear in zones considered to have low radiation in the past.
Generalization such as Rounding 2, which provides a good privacy-
utility tradeoff for aggregated statistics, also performs poorly. In this
case the defense causes hotspots to disappear, potentially causing a
dangerous situation if a high radiation zone is marked as safe. We
also carry out experiments with Hiding mechanisms and we find that,
similarly to Rounding, they miss some of the original hotspots.
Takeaways. Considering only the privacy loss, see Section 2.6, GeoInd
variants (except GeoInd 50m) and Rounding to 2 decimals seem to
offer the best performance, while Random sampling and Release’s
provided protection is too dependent on users’ movement profiles.
However, an analysis of the utility impact, in particular the semantic
interpretation or the case of high precision measurements, indicates
that none of the existent LPPMs is well suited for the Safecast setting.
The semantic interpretation results indicated that even if two defenses
produce similar average results, the outliers they create can convey
opposite messages. Furthermore, even a slight addition of noise or gen-
eralization can hinder the project’s ability to correctly locate abnormal
events. These limitations effectively prevent Safecast from deploying
them and protect their users’ privacy.11
2.6.4.2 Radiocells
Radiocells’ utility function is rather different than the one for Safecast.
Instead of averaging measurements associated to a location, Radio-
cells averages all reported coordinates associated to an antenna to
locate its position. We show the utility loss for different LPPMs when
performing this task in Figure 2.17.
All GeoInd variants result in high utility loss, with medians between
80 and 400 meters, and with outliers beyond 2 kilometers. Surprisingly,
in this use case hiding mechanisms (Release and Random) have many
outliers. After manual inspection, we found out that several Radio-
cell users had inconsistent measurements. For instance, a user was
swapping her measurements’ longitudes and latitudes in a random
11 This statement was verified in communication with Safecast.
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Figure 2.15: Safecast: Hotspot detection for areas in Tokyo with at least 100
cpm. Comparison of various defenses vs the original hotspots.
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Figure 2.16: Safecast: Hotspot detection for areas in Fukushima with at
least 100 cpm. Comparison of various defenses vs the original
hotspots.
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pattern. Other outliers are caused by providers moving their antennas
creating mixed measurements for a given ID. For these cases, hiding
LPPMs may greatly affects the average computation. Furthermore,
hiding defenses may also influence the number of antennas located.
In our dataset we detect from 10.2% up to 18.6% fewer antennas when
the Release defense is used, and the Random mechanism eliminates
from 2.6% up to 13.7% of them.
The best mechanism in the Radiocells dataset is Release GeoInd
which offer on average lower utility loss than other LPPMs and pro-
vide acceptable privacy. However, some antennas might be moved over
a kilometer away. The next best alternative is Rounding 2, that has a
higher median utility loss, but no outliers. However, as the goal of the
project is to accurately detect antennas in order to give individuals the
ability to geolocate themselves offline or to enable scientific studies, a
median error of 100 meters (Release GeoInd) or 200 meters (Rounding
2) is considered too large and precludes Radiocells from deploying
them.
Figure 2.17: Radiocells: Utility loss (distance from original tower location).
2.7 towards privacy-preserving mobile crowdsourcing
As our goal is to empower MCS application developers for more
privacy aware system designs, we illustrate how parts of this chapter
can be used as a tool for privacy analysis of location data.12 Moreover,
we elaborate on technical and non-technical steps to enhance privacy
at smaller utility cost in the context of MCS applications.
12 The code for the evaluation is available at https://github.com/sboukoros/Location-
Privacy-Framework
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Figure 2.18: Systematic privacy evaluation of mobile crowdsourcing. Green
color denotes the modules that can be updated.
2.7.1 A tool for the systematic evaluation of LPPMs for MCS
To conduct the study described in this chapter, we implemented three
different modules: one for the attacks (Section 2.4), one for the defenses
(Section 2.5), and one to evaluate the defenses’ privacy gain (Section
2.5.2) and utility loss (Section 2.5.3). These modules can be combined
to build a tool (see Figure 2.18) to enable application developers (as
well as users) to understand the privacy risks stemming from sharing
geo-located data with crowdsourcing applications. The tool can then
be used to evaluate the effectiveness of existing privacy-preserving
mechanisms and take an informed decision depending on their impact
on the application’s utility.
The tool works as follows. It receives as input the original mea-
surements reported to the crowdsourcing application as a Comma
Separated Values (CSV) file, where each line represents a geo-located
value. In our current implementation the file contains the following
fields: User ID, Captured Time, Latitude, Longitude, offset from UTC
time and Value. This file is input to the defenses module where a
selected defense, or None if one wants to evaluate the privacy risk
associated to the publication of the raw data, is selected to modify
the location of the entries. Note that, for certain defenses, this entails
eliminating rows. Both the original and the defense file(s) are input to
the utility function module that is instantiated for the particular ap-
plication under study, and to the attack module. The outputs of these
modules are the utility, and the clusters for the raw and modified data.
Using any available API (in our case OpenStreetMap Overpass API)
the tool retrieves the POIs inside these regions. With this information
the tool can compute the privacy gain and the utility loss and display
them in a way understandable by the users (e.g., with plots).
All modules in the code are implemented as standalone functions
or scripts. This way, new attacks, defenses, or metrics can be easily
added to our framework by researchers and developers. Also, the mod-
ules can be integrated into mobile crowdsourcing applications design
frameworks to support privacy practices in software engineering.
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2.7.2 Towards effective defenses
In this section, we discuss possible strategies to improve the trade-off
between users’ privacy and MCS utility.
An unexplored approach is the use of advanced cryptographic pro-
tocols to compute the values of interest for MCS without revealing the
users’ individual values to the providers [59]. For instance, users could
use multi-party computation to collaboratively compute aggregates
and only report the result to the provider. However, cryptographic
approaches require high computational power on the users’ side and
increase the bandwidth needs to perform the joint computation. Fur-
thermore, this would limit the availability of raw measurements for
analysis others than those predefined by the cryptographic protocols,
which is at odds with the principles of open data and open science
defended by most of the MCS platforms.
In our evaluation, we only considered spatial generalization. An-
other avenue to explore would be to also generalize the time dimen-
sion. While on its own time obfuscation cannot hide patterns revealed
by repeated visits, this technique could be combined with full de-
identification and hiding of users to mitigate the inferences of the
adversary. For instance, the MCS service provider could release a
batch of measurements once a day or once a week without linking
these to any user identifier. These techniques would be cheaper than
the use of cryptography, but require to trust the service provider to
apply the sanitization.
A third research path is the co-design of defenses and aggregation
algorithms. In this chapter, we have considered that the output of the
LPPMs is directly input to the utility functions currently used by MCS
providers. However, it would be possible that the providers adapt
their data processing to account for noise, using statistical methods or
machine learning, as done in fields that rely on noisy sensors [137] or
train in different settings from which they are deployed [62, 121, 149].
Finally, MCS could provide users with dedicated local software
(e.g., building on our evaluation method) to alert them regarding
the privacy dangers of publishing raw location data. Such a system
would allow them to selectively hide some of their measurements,
reducing the confidence of inference attacks. We note that, when
building such a tool, one would like to consider attacks beyond the
POI-based inferences, such as co-location attacks [120].
2.7.3 Best practices for mobile crowdsourcing developers
During this study, we identified a number of issues related to the
collection and sharing of data that, even though cannot fully prevent
inference, could make inference attacks detectable and could render
potential attackers accountable.
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A first consideration to make is the type of policy under which
MCS publish the collected data. While making large datasets available
to everyone for unrestricted use is admirable, and certainly of high
value for the academic community, it can have serious implications for
the altruistic contributors. To reduce this risk, developers could add
clauses to the policies that not only mandate that use of the data is
properly acknowledged, but also that it is well documented, implying
that researchers or other individuals have to disclose how they have
processed the data and for which purpose.
Second, both Safecast and Radiocells datasets are available for down-
load without the need for authentication. This hinders traceability of
who has the data, and thus enables stealthy attacks where nor the
users neither the applications are aware of the danger. Like in other
projects that make data available for research and other purposes (e.g.,
the Drebin project13), these sites could require simple registration to
maintain a log of who has had access to the datasets. Together with
the previous requirement, which would include documentation of
sharing, it should help mitigating the risks.
Third, these applications typically do not perform any control on
who are the contributors. This poses a particular problem when it
comes to children. In many jurisdictions, children’s data are subject to
particular legislation [134, 150], and in particular require the parents’
consent to be collected and processed. The lack of controls upon
collection implies that the datasets could contain children’s geo-located
data collected illegally. Adding controls would solve this problem and
also support the previous two points.
Finally, the datasets we studied contain data from users from all over
the world. These users, therefore, are subject to different legislations
that regulate how their data can be processed. While this may not be a
problem for corporations or criminals that want to exploit the datasets,
it creates a hurdle for researchers who have to obtain approval from
their institution for data processing. Lack of proper documentation
may limit the free use of the data for science, effectively hindering one
of the main goals of these applications. Better documentation as to
the origin of data and its use possibilities would greatly facilitate the
process.
2.8 chapter summary
In this chapter we explored the applicability of location privacy LPPMs
in the context of mobile crowdsourcing. For our experimentation we
used data and utility functions from actual crowdsourcing projects.
We first validated the privacy danger of publishing raw location data
by performing inference attacks on the Safecast dataset. Then, our re-
sults in the quantification of privacy gain and privacy-utility trade-off,
13 https://www.sec.cs.tu-bs.de/~danarp/drebin/
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illustrated that traditional LPPMs are not applicable in the scenario
under study as they have been optimized for a different use case. Fur-
thermore, we provided guidelines and showed how our work can be
compiled into a tool to enable further research into privacy preserving
mobile crowdsourcing and guidelines to application developers of
MCS projects.
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3.1 smart metering
Smart meters are the next generation electricity measurement devices
which also have networking capabilities. They allow energy suppli-
ers a permanent and detailed monitoring of their customers’ energy
consumption in order to reduce costs through more efficient and au-
tomatized power management. Besides the obvious advantages for
energy suppliers, the expected increase in renewable energy, electric
cars and prosumers (consumers that also produce) in the following
decades, require more reliable and flexible energy networks. Such
networks consisting of smart meters are called smart grids. A smart
grid is basically an advanced, multi-directional power network and
is regarded as the future of energy supply systems. In recent years,
many countries worldwide introduced laws in order to expedite the
use of smart meters in households. An example is the EU Directive
2006/32/EC, which asks all EU member states to provide “individ-
ual meters that accurately reflect the final customer’s actual energy
consumption and that provide information on actual time of use” for
energy consumers [123].
Despite the economical and ecological advantages for the involved
parties, the widespread information flow from energy consumers to
producers is a serious threat to the consumers’ privacy. The establish-
ment of smart meters generates sensitive data to an extent that could
not be reached using conventional meters. The continuous disclo-
sure of energy consumption data in conjunction with algorithms like
non-intrusive appliance load monitoring (NILM) [85, 100], helps third
parties to figure out daily routines of households, particular appliance
uses, individuals’ presence in a building or even the movie play-
ing on the television [82]. If marketing agencies collude with energy
suppliers, they can gather detailed information regarding household
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appliances [101]. It’s not hard to imagine that these data can be used
for targeted advertisement campaigns, new offers, etc. Criminals who
are able to tap into a meter’s data management system could predict
when the occupants of a building will not be present [102]. Therefore,
they can orchestrate their illegal activities more accurately. Even worse,
mass surveillance is significantly enhanced. With little resources, inter-
ested malicious parties can observe the daily routines of millions of
households.
These privacy concerns have been known to academia, industry
and governmental institutions for years and therefore, a plethora of
privacy mechanisms have been proposed to protect the consumers’
privacy in the smart grid. The most promising and well researched
privacy mechanisms are based on aggregation schemes, e.g., [78, 99,
103, 107, 111]. The core idea is to form groups of devices within the
smart grid. Then, only the aggregated power consumption of the
group is periodically reported to the energy supplier. The aggregate of
a group can securely be computed using either a trusted third party,
or preferably through cryptographic means, e.g., partial homomorphic
encryption, secret sharing or other secure computation techniques.
This solution has also been suggested as the-way-to-go by an expert
group, set up by the European Commission [159].
Even though secure aggregation is technically solved, a major ques-
tion has, to the best of our knowledge, barely been addressed. Namely,
which aggregation size (number of smart meters in every group) is
required to achieve privacy for consumers. During the smart meter
roll-out in the United Kingdom, a study conducted by the industrial
body “Energy Networks Association” concluded that aggregating the
consumption of only two smart meters provides sufficient customer
privacy [116]. However, this result seems to be elusive. It is not hard to
imagine two households, where one person works during day shifts,
while the other during night shifts. An aggregate of the two load
profiles is protecting neither household because the two individuals
will most likely be at home and use their appliances at different times.
For the aforementioned reasons, in this chapter we evaluate the
privacy achieved by smart meter’s aggregation schemes. Such a study,
benefits users who soon many have to install smart meters in their
home as they will be able to understand the privacy risks involved
even in the case of aggregate reports. Additionally, it sheds light to
the dilemma of whether two (or just a few) smart meters in aggregates
offer adequate privacy.
Chapter outline
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. We discuss related
work in Section 3.2, before introducing our metric in Section 3.3. Then,
in Section 3.4 the analyzed datasets and the evaluation approach are
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described. In Section 3.5 we apply the proposed metric on real energy
consumption datasets and present various case studies. Furthermore,
in Section 3.6 we study the diversity of energy consumption and the
applicability of generated load profiles for privacy research.
3.2 related work
3.2.1 Privacy mechanisms for smart metering
Various privacy enhancing technologies have been proposed for smart
metering. Fhom et al. [71] proposed the use of a third party that
anonymizes the data and empowers users. This party is instantiated
as a software solution inside the users’ premises. Users can specify
their privacy requirements, get feedback regarding their privacy levels
based on the data they share with the energy providers, and specify
by which entities their data can be processed. Kalogridis et al. [91]
proposed to blur the load signature of individual smart meters – that
is the unique patterns of every load profile, in order to achieve privacy.
This can be achieved by the use of a battery and an algorithm that
distributes energy accordingly.
Crypotographic solutions have also been proposed for smart me-
tering. Efthymiou and Kalogridis [67] proposed a third party escrow
architecture, that anonymizes consumption data by assigning two
different IDs to the data; an anonymous high-frequency ID and an
attributable low-frequency ID. The latter is assigned to low frequent
consumption data needed for billing, while the high frequent data
used for continuous demand monitoring is attributed with the HFID.
Molina-Markham et al. [114], using actual smart meters load profiles
from three houses demonstrate how without any prior knowledge an
adversary can infer basic information such residents’ presence, the
amount of people in the building, sleep patterns or single appliance’s
usage. Then, using zero-knowledge proofs, they proposed a privacy
preserving protocol for smart metering billing. Using the proposed
protocol the provider can only learn the final cost of the electricity
consumed but not the power profile. However, as it is necessary for
the provider to have some knowledge of load profiles for analysis and
prediction, the protocol sends high resolution data to the provider in
aggregates. Chim et al. [49] proposed a system for privacy-preserving
authentication with tamper resistant devices and pseudo-identities.
Through homomorphic encryption, the system also supports smart
meter reports’ aggregation within regions. Their system assumes how-
ever, that the energy provider is a trusted party which knows the
actual identities of the users and hence, their energy consumption.
Danezis et al. [55] designed privacy-preserving protocols for a vari-
ety of smart metering operations. Their models, based on multiparty
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computation with secret sharing, demonstrate how operations such as
fraud detection or advanced statistics are feasible.
Differential privacy mechanisms have been explored in the context
of smart meters. Acs and Castelluccia [30] proposed a distributed noise
addition mechanism in order to avoid third parties. In their scheme
smart meters are clustered to groups and each smart meters transmits
its data encrypted after it has added noise. In such a way the provider
cannot obtain values from independent smart meters. Backes and
Meiser [35] also explored the use of rechargeable batteries as means to
provide privacy however, with differentially private guarantees. Their
system adds or subtracts noise to the electrical grid monitored by the
smart meter, while recharging the battery. However, the latter happens
in a way that cannot be inferred by the smart meters logs as if the
usage pattern of such a battery is inferred, it can be detrimental to
privacy. Zhang et al. [158] also proposed a battery-based differentially
private scheme. However, in their work they aimed to maximize cost
saving under static and dynamic pricing policies.
Aggregation of smart meters reports is a well explored privacy mech-
anism. Usually, the aggregation happens either by a trusted third party
or better by cryptographic protocols. Garcia and Barts [78] proposed
an additively homomorphic encryption scheme for detecting fraud
in smart metering. They rely on a concentrator device that provides
energy to a cluster of smart meters and wants to detect inconsistencies
between the aggregate report of the smart meters and the energy it
has actually provided. In order to check for such energy leakages, the
smart meters via homomorphic encryption and the help of the concen-
trator, securely aggregate their results in regular intervals and report
the collective consumption. Then, with a simple comparison between
the reported value and the energy load the concentrator had provided
to the meters, leakage is detected. Marmol et al. [111] proposed an
aggregation scheme based on bihomomorphic encryption, i.e. an en-
cryption scheme additively homomorphic in plaintext and key space.
In their mechanism, every smart meters encrypts and transmits their
data over a secure channel. The provider, whose key is an aggregate of
all the smart meters’ keys, can only decrypt the data after aggregating
them. Li et al. [103] also rely on homomorphic encryption to aggregate
smart meters reports. The reports are incrementally aggregated and
encrypted over paths that cover all the smart meters until they reach
the energy provider. Lu et al. [107] proposed a homomorphic encryp-
tion scheme with better performance than previous attempts. Their
scheme is based on optimizations in terms of communications and
allows aggregation of multidimensional data. In the same direction,
Kursawe et al. [99] presented four different aggregation based privacy
mechanisms using various cryptographic approaches achieving lower
complexity than previous mechanisms.
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3.2.2 Privacy quantification
Various works aim to quantify privacy in the context of smart grids.
Lisovich and Wicker [106] investigated privacy in smart metering
and more specifically, what an adversary can infer about residents’
habits including, presence or absence, sleep and wake cycles and
appliance usage. They processed load profiles with behavior extraction
algorithms and compared their results with those of actual cameras.
They quantified the privacy loss using metrics about correct inferences,
i.e. whenever the camera was detecting something and the results of
the algorithm would agree. Their results portray that basic routines
can be inferred with high accuracy.
Dong et al. [60] quantified the utility-privacy trade off in smart
metering. Their scheme works under the assumption that users’ en-
ergy consumption follows a hierarchical Bayesian model where users
have some private behavior, this behavior is reflected on the users’
device usage patterns and hence affect the final load profile. They
introduced a privacy metric called inferential privacy that in essence,
measures the adversarial error where the adversary tries to infer users’
private behaviors (such as usage of specific devices), having access to
the smart meter’s current and past reports, and knowledge of how
various types of consumers use their devices. Eibl and Engel [68] ex-
amined the effect of differential privacy on the utility of smart meters’
aggregated reports. Using actual user data, they added laplacian noise
to aggregates and studied the effects of different differential privacy
parameters and the number of smart meters in the aggregate. Their
results identify several open issues in the application of differential
privacy such as the determination of the correct privacy parameters
and the amplitude of the noise in small aggregates. Shankar et al. [136]
developed a formal framework for smart metering where they eval-
uated privacy and utility. In their work, they modeled smart meters’
measurements using hidden markov models. Their utility metric is
based on the distortion function between real and perturbed data.
They measure privacy loss via the mutual information between the
original time series and the one after defenses are in place.
Our contribution
The privacy modeling proposed in this chapter is based on the crypto-
graphic game developed by Bohli et al. [42]. The goal of their game is
the evaluation of privacy protection mechanisms for a group of smart
meters. The privacy level provided by the smart meter application
is defined as the advantage of an adversary over random guessing,
when distinguishing two groups of smart meters and their protected
load profiles. In contrast, this chapter explores the creation of a cryp-
tographic game to isolate individuals in aggregation schemes of various
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loads. In our work, we use a more realistic adversarial model and real
world datasets. Moreover, using our proposed game we further explore
various properties of the aggregates and their impact to privacy.
3.3 aggregation privacy model
As discussed, many cryptographic schemes have been proposed that
allow the privacy preserving (provably secure) computation of smart
meter aggregates. However, only a few metrics have been proposed
that assess the effectiveness of smart grid privacy protection mecha-
nisms in a formal and sound manner.
We propose such a framework, but first we formalize data aggre-
gation in the smart grid before we iteratively develop our privacy
metric.
3.3.1 Smart grid aggregation model
We make use of the following abstraction, which models the interac-
tion between smart meters and an energy supplier. Informally speak-
ing, when using privacy-preserving aggregation schemes, the energy
supplier should learn the aggregated power consumption of groups
of smart meters in every measurement period. For simplicity, we
reduce our model to a single group of meters. Thus, the model con-
sists of an energy supplier ES and a group (set) of smart meters
S = {s1, s2, . . . , sn} with n > 1. For practicality, we further assume a
virtual party, the aggregator V , which connects all smart meters in
S with the ES. In practice, this aggregator can either be instantiated
by a trusted third party or by a cryptographic aggregation protocol,
established between the smart meters. Moreover, a discrete notion of
time T = {1, 2, 3, ...} is used. In each time period t ∈ T , every smart
meter si is attributed with a power consumption value ei,t ∈ R, where
R is the set of possible readings from a power consumption meter.
Furthermore, we refer to consecutive consumption values as load
profile. We denote a load profile of length l for a single smart meter si
with êi(l) = (ei,1, ei,2, . . . , ei,l). In every time period, all smart meters
report their consumption to the aggregator V , who computes the sum
of all consumption values at =
∑n
i=1 ei,t and finally reports at to ES.
We remark that we do not model further knowledge of the ES explic-
itly, yet consider background knowledge of any malicious adversary
implicitly through the metric proposed in the next subsections.
3.3.2 Requirements of privacy notions for aggregation in the smart grid
To assess the privacy protection offered by aggregation schemes in
the smart grid, we identify the following requirements. A privacy
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framework that allows to measure privacy leakage in aggregation
schemes, should
• provide a strong formalism that allows reasoning about the
provided privacy level, e.g., should allow to compute bounds;
and should preferably
• allow to reason about practical attacks, i.e., it should be possible
to show that these (with a certain probability) will fail.
Moreover, for a study of the trade-off between utility and privacy of
the aggregated data, such a privacy framework should:
• provide an adequate adversarial modeling. Hence, it should
consider a powerful adversary. Yet, the adversary’s power should
not be overestimated in order to achieve realistic assessments
and to maximize utility.
Achieving an adequate modeling of the adversary, especially its
background knowledge, which defines its strength, is a challenging
task, which is discussed in more detail in the next subsections.
3.3.3 Smart grid privacy model
We define privacy for aggregation schemes using an indistinguisha-
bility notion. The core idea is to define privacy as the hardness to
distinguish two load profiles known to the adversary in an aggregate.
Informally speaking, the better the adversary in distinguishing pro-
files in aggregates, the weaker the privacy protection of individual
households is in the aggregate. The strength of such a game based
privacy notion is that it allows the modeling of arbitrary adversarial
background knowledge, enabling us to model realistic and powerful
attackers.
3.3.3.1 Formal Privacy Game
The basic game is illustrated in Figure 3.1. First, challenger and ad-
versary agree on a load profile generator Egen, the number of smart
meters in the aggregate m, and the load profiles’ length l. Egen can
either be a set of load profiles, e.g., from a real world consumption
data set, or a sampling function that samples (realistic) load profiles
from a probability distribution. After the initial setup phase, the ad-
versary chooses (or samples, as described in the next paragraph) two
load profiles ê0 and ê1 of length l from Egen, which are then sent to
the challenger. The challenger draws a random bit r ∈ {0, 1}, samples
m− 1 further load profiles ê2, ê3, . . . êm, and computes their aggre-
gate êa = êr + ê2 + . . . êm. The aggregate is sent to the adversary
who computes a decision function fdec(êa, ê0, ê1) that returns a bit
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Inputs: Egen,m, l
Adversary Challenger
ê0, ê1 ← Egen ê0, ê1−−−−−−→r←$ {0, 1}
ê2, ê3, . . . , êm←$Egen
compute aggregate êa:
êa←−−−−−−êa ← êr + ê2 + · · ·+ êm
g← fdec(êa, ê0, ê1) g−−−−−−→output (g = r)
Figure 3.1: Basic privacy game for aggregation schemes (AggG) in the smart
grid.
g ∈ {0, 1}, representing the guess whether ê0 or ê1 is contained in the
aggregate. On a correct guess, the challenger outputs true, and false
otherwise. We refer to the game as privacy aggregation game (AggG).
The privacy of an aggregation scheme can be measured by the chances
of an adversary in winning AggG. As in [42], we formally define the
advantage of an adversary A for a given load profile generator Egen, a
number of smart meters m and load profile length l as the advantage
over random guessing:
AdvAAggG(Egen,m, l) =
| Pr[AggGA(Egen,m, l, r = 0) = 0]
− Pr[AggGA(Egen,m, l, r = 1) = 0]|.
3.3.3.2 Practical Privacy Notion
Assuming an adversary with an optimal decision function, the out-
come of one instance of the privacy game mainly depends on two
aspects. Namely, it depends on the load profiles chosen by the adversary
and the load profiles sampled by the challenger. For example, assuming
two load profiles with very distinct (visual) shape chosen by the ad-
versary and load profiles with a flat shape sampled by the challenger,
these distinct shape of the chosen load profiles may also become visi-
ble in the aggregate and allows a decision with high certainty. Thus,
the adversary’s advantage in the privacy game noticeably depends on
the load profile generator Egen, namely, how distinct the generated
load profiles are and how these are distributed, as the advantage is
computed over all possible aggregates.
An adversary A maximizes its advantage by choosing load pro-
files that are the most distinct. Computing the maximum possible
advantage allows to determine bounds on the privacy leakage and
resembles the scenario for the worst case consumer with a very dis-
tinct energy consumption. We refer to this advantage as (AdvA,maxAggG ).
However, this notation might overestimate the privacy leakage for the
average consumer, whose consumption is more similar to the average
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energy consumption of other consumers. Therefore, we introduce a
second interpretation of AggG, which is the average advantage over
all combinations of load profiles that can be chosen by A (AdvA,avgAggG ).
3.3.3.3 General Applicability
Revisiting the requirements of a privacy metric for aggregation, we
observe that the AggG provides a strong formalism. Moreover, the
applied indistinguishability notion is powerful, as it allows to model
arbitrary, yet realistic background knowledge (load profiles are chosen
from Egen) of the adversary.
To illustrate the applicability of AggG, we consider the following
exemplary privacy violation. The question whether it is possible to in-
fer from a given aggregate that a consumer is at home during daytime
can be modeled in AggG by choosing a load profile representing this
consumption as ê0 and a different typical load profile where the con-
sumer is not at home as ê1. A significant advantage in AggG indicates
that a malicious energy supplier is able to answer this question with
some certainty. A further practical attack, which can be modeled with
the AggG is illustrated in Section 3.5, where we show that individual
appliances can be detected in an aggregate with their signature.
On a first glance the game based definition with the precise knowl-
edge of ê0 and ê1 might seem as overestimating the adversaries ca-
pabilities. However, in practice energy suppliers have access to a
significant amount of external information that can be very close to
the knowledge of precise load profiles. For example, suppliers have
knowledge about:
• households contained in an aggregate (technical requirement for
most schemes),
• past load profiles of all aggregators,
• current and past montly billing information for every smart
meter and specific time charges,
• weather conditions, etc.
Moreover, we note that the adversary A in the AggG is given almost
no background information on the energy consumption of the other
households contained in the aggregate. A only knows that the aggre-
gate is sampled from a subset of realistic load profiles. In practice, it
is not unreasonable to assume, that a malicious supplier has further
background information, e.g., to the average power consumption of
multiple households contained in the aggregate, because these are
also customers that periodically report their consumption for billing
purposes. Moreover, as it has already been explored in the domain
of location privacy, simple usage patterns and routines of individuals
can be used to de-anonymize aggregates.
60 privacy assessment of aggregation schemes in smart metering
Due to these reasons, we consider the proposed metric as well suited
to show which aggregation sizes are insufficient and risk the loss of
privacy.
3.3.3.4 Further Application - Membership Disclosure
To further illustrate the versatility of the proposed metric, we describe
how the indistinguishablity based notion can be used to evaluate
membership disclosure, i.e., to answer the question whether household
x is contained in an aggregate or not. This can be evaluated by adapting
the AggG, such that the adversary only samples one load profile
ê0 ← Egen and the challenger samples the other profile ê1 ← Egen,
which is consequently unknown to the adversary. The rest of the game
can be left unchanged, and the adversarial advantage is computed as
the advantage over random guessing, whether ê0 or ê1 is contained in
the aggregate.
We note that the membership game is at least as hard as the indistin-
guishability game. Given an adversary that can win the membership
game, we can construct an adversary that is able to win the indis-
tinguishability game with the same advantage. In order to decide
which of two known profiles has been used in the aggregate of the
indistinguishability game, an adversary could use the membership
distinguisher to decide whether ê0 is contained in the aggregate or
not. The probability that ê0 is in the aggregate is the same in both
games. Hence, the adversary’s advantage is identical to the advantage
of the adversary in the membership game. However, the inverse re-
duction is impossible. Assuming that all but one load profiles, which
can be generated from Egen, are flat, i.e., constant, then an adversary
in the indistinguishability game has roughly twice the advantage to
observe the non-constant load profile than an adversary for the mem-
bership game, who only gets to see a single load profile. Thus, the
membership game is strictly harder than the indistinguishability game.
However, we observe that it is possible to construct a practical heuris-
tic fmemdec (êa, ê0) for the membership game, given a decision function
finddec(êa, ê0, ê1) for the indistinguishability game. Even without access
to ê1, an adversary in the membership game can repeatedly, i.e., a num-
ber of times k, invoke finddec(êa, ê0, êr) with a new randomly sampled
êr. Using a majority voting
∑k−1
i=0 f
ind
dec(êa, ê0, êr) > k/2, the adversary
A decides whether ê0 is in the aggregate. We give an experimental
evaluation of this privacy question and heuristic in Section 3.5.
3.4 methodology
In this section we first introduce the datasets under study. Then, we
display our methodology followed in the experimental section and
present the decision functions used to test the aggregates.
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3.4.1 Smart grid datasets
To identify aggregation sizes that provide sufficient privacy, we apply
the privacy game on multiple real world energy consumption datasets.
In Table 3.1, an overview of the datasets used in this chapter is given.
The datasets have mainly been made available for energy disaggre-
gation research. To the best of our knowledge, these are the largest
publicly available datasets regarding the number of load profiles. We
observe that the datasets have different geographical origins, as well as
different measurement set ups, e.g., resolutions. Moreover, we remark
that the datasets use different types of power measurement including
active, reactive and apparent power. Therefore, in most case studies
we distinguish between datasets and study them separately.
Some datasets, e.g., Dataport and UMASS, contain several hundreds
of households, whereas others, e.g., AMPds, focus on a single house-
hold for a large period of time. Unfortunately, only the Dataport and
GOVAU dataset contain consumption data for more than 6 smart
meters over multiple days.
Furthermore, most datasets require preprocessing, as they contain
up to 10% incomplete or unusable (e.g., NAN) load profiles due to
the experimental nature of energy consumption recording [95]. We
consider a load profile to be complete if at least one sample is recorded
in every sampling period required for a case study. Incomplete load
profiles have been removed from all studies. The difference in the
number of load profiles between complete and incomplete data is
shown in Table 3.2. Note that the number of (complete) load profiles
for each building in the same dataset may differ, therefore the total
number of load profiles is given.
Table 3.1: Datasets used for the analysis. Presented are the geographical
origin, the number of households measured in each dataset, the
average number of load profiles that have been recorded for each
household, and the sampling resolution.
Name Origin Households LPs/Hh Resolution
Dataport [90] US 707 647 15 min
Redd [95] US 5 7 1 s
AMPds [110] Canada 1 726 1 min
ECO [40, 94] Switzerland 6 192 1 min
UCI [105] France 1 1358 1 min
GOVAU [81] Australia 31 406 30 min
UMASS [38] US 376 1 1 min
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3.4.2 Evaluation approach
To identify an aggregation size that protects the consumer’s privacy,
an implementation on the privacy game was created. To handle most
of the datasets, we rely on the NILMTK framework [39], which has
been developed to study energy disaggregation algorithms (NILM).
NILMTK provides converters for most of the aforementioned datasets
into a consistent data representation. The adversary is modeled in the
form of a decision function fdec that decides between two chosen load
profiles ê0 and ê1. Different decision functions, which use a variety
of heuristics, are introduced in the next section. For all case studies
presented in Section 3.5, we apply the following algorithm:
1. For the analysis, we choose a dataset, an aggregation size m, a
temporal resolution σ (the sampling frequency, e.g., σ = 15 min),
an adversarial strategy (decision function fdec), and a number
of iterations N (e.g., N = 5000).
2. Then, the algorithm is reading the dataset. A dataset consists
of multiple households with continuous load samples over one
or multiple time periods. The load samples are grouped in load
profiles of fixed start and end time. If not stated otherwise, each
load profile starts at midnight with a duration of 24 hours in all
experiments.
3. Next, the algorithm removes all incomplete load profiles, i.e.,
load profiles that do not have at least one load sample per
sampling period.
4. If the input dataset is more granular than the chosen resolu-
tion, it reduces the resolution of all load profiles, by temporal
aggregation of consecutive load samples.
Table 3.2: The number of buildings in each dataset that have at least one
complete load profile and the total number of (complete) load
profiles per dataset for a sampling resolution of 15min. The fraction
of the usable against the total number of load profiles is displayed.
Buildings Load profiles
Name complete total complete total usable
Dataport 707 729 458048 474523 96.52%
Redd 6 6 53 236 22.45%
Ampds 1 1 726 730 99.45%
ECO 6 6 1196 1337 89.45%
UCI 1 1 1405 1440 97.56%
GOVAU 31 31 12606 12917 97.59%
UMASS 377 377 367 377 97.34%
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5. The algorithm then selects two different households from the
dataset uniformly at random. From the two households, it sam-
ples one load profile for each household. The sampled load
profiles are labeled as ê0 and ê1. This process ensures that even
though different households might have a different number of
load profiles, all households are represented equally in the result.
6. Analogously, it selects m− 1 load profiles from the remaining
households. It samples a random bit r ∈ {0, 1} and the m− 1 load
profiles are summed up and added to êr to create an aggregated
load profile êa.
7. The decision function fdec is evaluated on êa, ê0 and ê1.
8. If fdec decided correctly (i.e., fdec(êa, ê0, ê1) = r) a correct guess
is recorded.
9. Steps 5-8 are repeated N times. Afterwards, the adversarial
advantage values are computed as:
Advfdec,avgAggG (m) =
∣∣∣∣correct guessesN − 0.5
∣∣∣∣ · 2.
3.4.3 Decision functions
For two given load profiles ê0 and ê1, an adversary in AggG has to
decide which of the two is more likely contained in the aggregated
load profile êa. In practice, finding an optimal decision is a hard
computational problem, as an optimal distinguisher has to decide
according to the maximum likelihood over all possible combinations
of load profiles. Therefore, we focus on studying four heuristics and
show in Section 3.5 that the described (comparably simple) heuristics
are sufficient to identify load profiles in the aggregate. For better
comparison, the aggregated load profiles are first normalized by the
aggregation size: êa ← êa/m. The chosen decision functions are based
on i) the mean squared error (MSE), ii) the Pearson correlation, iii) peak
detection and iv) a combined method based on Pearson correlation and
peak detection. These heuristics have been chosen, as they all allow
to measure a distance between two time series and follow different
approaches.
In i) the MSE is computed as the pairwise squared difference be-
tween load samples, hence, fMSEdec (êa, ê0, ê1) decides for ê0 only if
MSE(ê0, êa) < MSE(ê1, êa).
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The Pearson correlation also considers the trend of the compared
load profile and ii) is decided by the higher correlation, hence, the
function fcorrdec(êa, ê0, ê1) decides for ê0 if
corr(ê0, êa) > corr(ê1, êa).
In iii) the relative peaks of each load profile êa, ê0, ê1, are deter-
mined and fpeakdec (êa, ê0, ê1) decides according the most common peaks
between ê0 and êa, or ê1 and êa. Peak detection is a promising ap-
proach, as it considers the most significant features of a load profile
that (in our expectation) could also be visible in an aggregate. For the
peak extraction we follow a simple approach, where a window around
every sample of length ±1(a resolution unit) is selected. If a sample
has a value higher than its neighbors it is considered as a peak. For
illustration, in Figure 3.2 a slice of an exemplary load profile ê0 and
an aggregated load profile êa, the identified peaks, and the windows
of size three around each peak are shown. In the shown slice the load
profiles only share one peak at 01:00 o’clock.
The decision function iv) combines peak detection and correlation
with the idea that the shape of the load profile surrounding the
peaks carries more information than the peak itself. Therefore, in
iv) all peaks of ê0, ê1 and êa are computed. Then, the union of the
peaks between of ê0 (ê1) and êa is formed. Afterwards, the Pearson
correlation is computed for a surrounding window of a fixed length
of samples around every peak, e.g. We identified a window of ±5 (i.e.,
windows size is 11) as the best heuristic for 15 minute readings (a
detailed analysis on the window size is given in the next section). The
decision function fcombdec (êa, ê0, ê1) decides according to the higher
mean correlation between all windows of ê0 and êa or ê1 and êa.
3.5 case studies
To analyze the privacy protection offered by aggregation schemes, we
perform multiple case studies. First, we show for multiple datasets that
the simple decision functions are sufficient to identify load profiles
within aggregates of sizes ranging from two to hundreds of buildings.
Moreover, we study the impact of temporal resolution, load profile
length and daytimes on the distinguishing advantage. Then, we show
that single appliances can be detected in aggregates consisting of load
profiles from multiple households. Finally, we investigate membership
disclosure in aggregates.
How effective are decision functions in identifying load profiles in
an aggregate? We evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed decision
functions by comparing them in the privacy game over N = 5000
simulations with different power measurements and time resolutions.
A decision function is effective, if the advantage over random guessing
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Figure 3.2: Shown is a slice of two exemplary load profiles (ê0, êa) and
marked are the identified peaks of each load profile. Moreover,
a window of size 3 is drawn around each load profile, which
has been used to identify the peaks (cf., Section 3.4.3). The time
resolution is 15 minutes.
is significant. The goal of the decision functions, as described in Sec-
tion 3.4.2, is to identify the correct profile (ê0 or ê1) contained in the
aggregate. First, we compare the average advantage of all proposed
decision functions on the Dataport dataset with a sampling resolution
of 15 minutes, shown in Figure 3.3. We observe that all heuristics can
identify the correct load profile for small aggregation sizes with signif-
icant advantage. More precisely, for only 2 load profiles, all methods
have an advantage of more than 75%. The Pearson correlation and
peak detection heuristics perform similar over all evaluated aggrega-
tion sizes, whereas the proposed combination is the most powerful
distinguisher. For aggregation sizes larger than 10, the advantage is
more than twice higher, than the best advantage of the other three
heuristics.
As already described in Section 3.4.3, the combined method com-
putes the Pearson correlation for a window of load samples around
all detected peaks. The window size, which influences the distin-
guishing advantage, is empirically evaluated in Figure 3.4. Plotted is
the averaged advantage for different window sizes for the combined
method on the Dataport dataset for three different sampling resolu-
tions (15 min, 60 min, and 120 min) over aggregation sizes from 2 to 30.
We observe that the best results are achieved for a moderately sized
window, e.g., 10 load samples for a 15 minute reading. Moreover, we
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Figure 3.3: Comparison of the four decision functions, based on averaged
adversarial advantage for different aggregation sizes (Dataport,
15 min resolution).
observe that a more granular sampling resolution requires more load
samples to be contained in the window to achieve the best advantage.
Which parameters influence the privacy game?
Dataset dependency. The results of an empirical analysis commonly
depend on the dataset used. To show that the difference in adversarial
advantage is rather small between the datasets, we compare the dis-
tinguishing advantage between the datasets Dataport and the other
two largest datasets (GOVAU and UMASS), for the combined decision
function in Figure 3.5. We observe that the power consumption in
UMASS is noticeable more distinguishable by the combined decision
function than the GOVAU and Dataport dataset, which share a very
similar (in-)distinguishability for increasing aggregation sizes.
Furthermore, we can illustrate a similar behavior of all four decision
functions on a union of all load profiles from all datasets. To sample a
load profile in this experiment, we first sample a dataset, then a house-
hold (uniformly among the dataset) and then a load profile (uniformly
among the household). This guarantees an equal representation of
datasets and households. We acknowledge that consequently some
load profiles have more impact on the results than others, unfortu-
nately the limited number of large datasets does not allow for a better
experimental setup. The distinguishing advantages in this experiment
are shown for different groups of aggregation sizes in Figure 3.6. We
observe a similar distinguishing advantage as when studying datasets
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Figure 3.5: Comparison of the averaged distinguishing advantage between
the UMASS, GOVAU, and Dataport dataset for different aggrega-
tion sizes, when using the combined decision function (30 min
resolution).
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Figure 3.6: Comparison of the decision functions based on the averaged
adversarial advantage, using different aggregation sizes, using
profiles from all datasets (30 min resolution).
independently. Moreover, as before the combined decision function
outperforms the others in every scenario, and hence will be used as
the main decision function in the remainder of this section.
In summary, the datasets show diversity in their load profiles, which
is also visible in the AggG. However, the difference in the results
between the datasets (also influenced by the empirical nature of our
approach) is only marginal when deriving qualitative statements on
the individuals’ privacy.
Temporal resolution. The rate at which each smart meter reports its
values, is a crucial factor for privacy. More frequent reports enable
NILM algorithms to work with higher accuracy and extract more
information. Hence, we expect that higher sampling resolutions are
less privacy friendly. In Figure 3.7, we present the advantage for differ-
ent aggregation sizes with different sampling resolutions when using
the combined decision function on the Dataport dataset. Clearly, the
advantage is higher for more frequent reports and smaller aggregation
sizes. In aggregations with 10 or more load profiles (m > 10), the
advantages differ only by a small factor independent of the temporal
resolution. When only two households are aggregated, a significant
advantage of 50% is observed for a temporal resolution as low as 4
hours. This confirms what we intuitively expected, namely that dis-
tinguishability increases with more frequent reports. In addition, it is
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Figure 3.7: Comparison of the impact of different temporal resolutions when
using different aggregation sizes m. Measured is averaged advan-
tage using the combined heuristic (Dataport).
clear from measurements that the aggregate of two load profiles is not
enough to provide privacy, even for a very low sampling resolution.
Influence of different daytimes. In previous evaluations, we studied load
profiles of 24h length. In this section, we examine if different daytimes
affect the model’s accuracy. The load profiles of the Dataport dataset
were split in four parts according their daytime. Those were, night
time (0:00-6:00), mornings (6:00-12:00), afternoons (12:00-18:00) and
evenings (18:00-24:00). We study aggregation sizes ranging from 2
to 50 households, and fix the sampling resolution to 15 minutes. We
performed 5000 simulations of the privacy game for each period. In
Table 3.3, the average advantage for the four different daytimes, as
well as for the whole day is presented. In summary, we observe only
marginal differences between the different daytimes, but as expected,
a 24 hour load profile allows for better distinguishability than isolated
daytimes.
How many households are required to achieve privacy? Bigger aggre-
gation sizes lead to better privacy for individual households. However,
an arbitrary increase in aggregation size defeats the purpose of smart
meters, which should be able to monitor and predict the consumption
in order to distribute energy more efficiently. Thus, an upper bound
exists on how many households should be in an aggregate report in
order for the smart grid to retain some utility. Unfortunately, we have
no (reasonable) measure of utility, yet we can identify a marginal util-
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Table 3.3: Average advantage when distinguishing load profiles of 6h length,
using the Dataport dataset (15 min resolution), compared with the
advantage when distinguishing a load profile of 24h length.
Daytime m = 2 m = 5 m = 10 m = 30 m = 50
Night 0.811 0.574 0.411 0.233 0.184
Morning 0.836 0.603 0.436 0.232 0.157
Afternoon 0.792 0.566 0.418 0.237 0.157
Evening 0.800 0.566 0.410 0.234 0.152
Day - 24h 0.947 0.793 0.634 0.396 0.29
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Figure 3.8: Adversarial advantages achieved with the combined decision
function for different aggregation sizes m. Marked with δ are
interesting advantage levels (Dataport, 15 min resolution).
ity on the privacy protection. Applying the AggG with the combined
heuristic on the Dataport dataset, which provides the largest number
of load profiles and households, for aggregation sizes of up to 700, we
can infer, which aggregation size is needed to achieve a certain level
of privacy (distinguishing advantage over random guessing) shown in
Figure 3.8 for a 15-minute sampling resolution. We denote with m the
size of the aggregate and with δ the average adversarial advantage.
The shape of the curve can be used to analyze the marginal utility. The
curve is very steep up to a privacy level of δ = 0.5, which is reached
in the experiment with an aggregation size of m = 23. At a privacy
level of δ = 0.2 (m = 92) the curve significantly starts to flatten out
with only marginal improvements in privacy after m = 200.
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Figure 3.9: Illustration of the imprecision in the experimental computation of
the distinguishing advantage for aggregation sizes m > 75 over
simulations with N = 5000 runs (Dataport, 15 min resolution).
We remark, that results for the distinguishing advantage for larger
aggregation sizes, e.g., above 100, should be studied with a grain of
salt. Even though, each data point is computed via a simulation over
5000 trials, it contains a noticeable error for larger aggregation sizes,
which is illustrated in Figure 3.9. We observe that similar aggregation
sizes can show a noticeable variance in the distinguishing advantage.
Are particular appliances detectable in an aggregation scheme? Spe-
cific appliances create unique patters in load profiles. NILM algorithms
can extract specific devices’ usage in single households, by detecting
those patterns. In order to examine if specific devices can be detected
in the aggregation, we adjust the adversary’s choices in the AggG.
The first load profile ê0 is sampled from the dataset, the second load
profile is generated by subtracting from the individually measured
load profile ê0 a single appliance. Hence, ê0 and ê1 only differ in the
energy consumption of a single appliance.
Using the Dataport dataset, we study the AggG for different aggre-
gation sizes and household appliances. In Figure 3.10, we present the
average adversarial advantage over random guessing, for an electric
furnace, a dish washer, a fridge and a stove. The results demonstrate
that specific appliances, e.g., electric furnace, are detectable with sig-
nificant advantage even in aggregates of size m > 10. As expected,
the detection is more powerful when aggregation is small. Figure 3.11
presents the adversarial advantage when detecting various devices in
the Dataport dataset, for aggregation sizes of m = 5, 10 and 25.
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Figure 3.10: The detectability of single appliances in an aggregate. Shown is
the distinguishing advantage for the combined decision function
(Dataport, 15 min resolution).
Table 3.4: Characteristic properties of particular appliances (average values).
Appliance
Mean
load(W)
Max
load (W) #Peaks
Daily
uptime Load/Peak
Dish washer 43.5 887.1 6.1 9% 504.5
Electric furnace 135.7 603.7 18.7 87% 305.8
Fridge 77.1 344.5 23.2 50% 143.9
Stove 55.0 1110.8 9.6 27% 440.7
To identify specific patterns that make a load profile (of an appli-
ance) distinguishable in an aggregate, we study various properties
of appliances in the dataset, namely: mean load (when switched on),
maximum load, the number of peaks, as well as the daily uptime and
average load per peak. The results are illustrated in Table 3.4. The
correlation between the characteristic properties and the detectability,
using the Pearson correlation between the properties and the advan-
tage per aggregation size is depicted in Figure 3.12.
We observe that the detectability of an appliance shows the largest
correlation with the maximum load, followed by the average load per
peak. The correlation between average mean load and the detectability
is significantly lower, while the properties average daily uptime and
number of peaks are negatively correlated to the privacy level. To
conclude, not only households but also individual appliances that
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of appliances for different aggregation sizes.
show consumption patterns with high peaks can be detected with
minimal effort in aggregates of smaller size.
Can membership in an aggregate be disclosed using the same decision
functions? A further application of AggG is outlined in Section 3.3,
namely whether an adversary could identify the existence of a single
profile in an aggregate rather than distinguishing two known profiles.
Hence, shifting the focus from an indistinguishability notion to a
membership disclosure question. As described, the privacy game has
to be adapted in the following way; instead of having the adversary
select two profiles and then try to distinguish which one is in the
aggregate, he only samples one (ê0). Then the challenger randomly
samples a second one (ê1), unknown to the adversary, and by flipping a
coin decides which one of the two will used in the aggregate sent to the
adversary. The adversary has then to guess, whether this profile is part
of the aggregate or not. Using a similar experimental setup as before,
we studied this questions for the Dataport dataset with aggregation
sizes fromm = 2 to 20 andN = 1000 simulations per aggregation sizes.
Moreover, we used the decision functions as described in Section 3.3
with k = 100 iterations. In Figure 3.13 the advantage for correct
answering the membership question with the help of the two most
effective heuristics, i.e., peak detection and the combined method is
presented. In addition, the advantage in the indistinguishability notion
for the same aggregation sizes is given.
Even though the adversary has less power in this game, and conse-
quently, the advantage decreases compared to the indistinguishably
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Figure 3.13: Comparison of the modified privacy game where the adversary
has knowledge of only one load profile (membership disclo-
sure) vs when he distinguishes two profiles (indistinguishability
notion). For each experiment, the distinguishing advantage for
the two most effective heuristics (peak detection and combined
method) for aggregation sizes of up to 20 households is dis-
played. (Dataport, 15 min resolution).
game, we observe that the advantage remains significant for all aggre-
gation sizes. A more surprising result is that that peak detection and
the combined methods perform similarly for membership disclosure,
in contrast with the cases previously examined. This again indicates
that the peaks are the most robust feature to distinguish load profiles.
In summary, the AggG is very suited to also examine privacy under
a different view point, i.e., membership disclosure, with small modifi-
cation. Furthermore, even in the membership based privacy notion,
very simple heuristics are able to achieve a significant advantage over
random guessing for larger aggregation sizes.
3.6 dataset analysis
Studying the detectability of individual load profiles with the help of
the aggregation game, a question arises, whether a common universal
load profile exists. The existence of a universal load profile could be
used to only consider the relative changes to the universal load profile
as privacy relevant and thus, demand a reformulation of the privacy
game. Therefore, in this section, we first study the differences between
individual load profiles and their average from the dataset. Second, to
overcome the very limited availability of real world energy consump-
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Figure 3.14: Mean load profiles of the datasets UMASS, Dataport, and GO-
VAU.
tion datasets, we study the applicability of load profile generators in
privacy research for the smart grid.
Universal load profile. While datasets from different countries pre-
sumably differ in their average load profile due to differences in cul-
tural and climatic preconditions, this does not apply to load profiles
from similar climate zones and cultural environments. Unfortunately,
the available data is insufficient to present an exhaustive analysis.
Yet, when comparing the average load profile of the Dataport (707
households) and GOVAU (31 households) and UMASS (376 house-
holds), shown in Figure 3.14, similarities in shape can be identified. For
example, comparatively low consumption values during night, and
consumption peaks in the morning and evening hours are visible. We
note that the different energy measurements (re-/active power) lead
to noticeable differences in the individual consumption values and
should therefore not be compared by their absolute value. Moreover,
we observe significant more variance in the UMASS datasets, which
only provides one load profile for every household.
Generally, we observe that individual load profiles can be quite
distinct from the average of a dataset. This is illustrated in Figure 3.15,
where the distribution of the mean squared error (MSE) between
all individual load profiles and their average is illustrated for the
Dataport dataset. Similarly, in Figure 3.16 the Pearson correlation
coefficient between individual load profiles and the dataset’s average
is plotted for the GOVAU and ECO dataset. Even though, there is
3.6 dataset analysis 77
0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
MSE in watt
fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Figure 3.15: Distribution of Mean Squared Error between individual load
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GOVAU ECO
−0.5
0
0.5
1
m
ea
n
co
rr
el
at
io
n
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
Correlation with household mean
Correlation with global mean
Figure 3.16: Distribution of correlation between single load profiles and the
datasets (GOVAU, Eco) or households average.
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a noticeable correlation to the datasets’ averages, we also observe
numerous outliers in both datasets, that are very different to the
average. Thus, load profiles carry significantly more information than
only small relative differences to the datasets average load profile.
Moreover, Figure 3.16 also shows the correlation of each load profile
to the household’s average. This correlation is (expectable) higher
than the correlation to the mean of the according dataset, yet also
shows a significant variance between the load profiles from the same
household.
In summary, we observe that (background) knowledge on the aver-
age load profile of a region or household could be used to improve
the detectability of load profiles in an aggregate. Yet, the significant
variance between load profiles illustrate that the protection of only
small changes to an average is insufficient.
Load profile generators for privacy research. Load profile generators
are tools that are able to simulate the energy consumption for a certain
period based on an underlying model. The area of application ranges
from studies concerning the effects of new technology on the energy
consumption of households to forecasts like the determination of the
national energy demand [143]. A natural question is if these generators
are adequate for a privacy analysis and could be considered in subse-
quent work. In this work, we focus on studying energy consumption
of individual households, and hence a load profile generator based on
the so called bottom-up approach is promising. Bottom-up load profile
generators aim at simulating the behavior of inhabitants of a house-
hold, that is modeled in the use of household appliances, e.g., cooking,
heating or television or other activities. According to the simulated
usage of appliances and (pre-recorded) appliance specific demand
profiles, load profiles for households are generated. The model can be
enhanced by external influences like temperature, holidays and geo-
graphic circumstances. Various bottom-up load profile generator have
been proposed in [126]. Using the implementation of the Loadprofile
Generator [28], we created a dataset containing 266 households with
365 load profiles per household, which is studied in the following
paragraphs.
In Figure 3.17 the mean load profile of the generated dataset is
shown. When comparing the dataset’s mean to the mean load profiles
of the datasets depicted in Figure 3.14 qualitatively, it is clear that all
datasets share similarities and prominent features like the peaks at
about 06:00 and after 18:00 can be found in both.
Similar to the previous analysis, we applied the privacy game to the
generated dataset using a resolution of 15 minutes on aggregates of
size m = 2 to 50. The results for all decision functions are illustrated
in Figure 3.18. We observe that all decision functions show a similar
behavior as on the real data sets, i.e., the combined decision function
outperforms the rest, whereas the MSE shows the least distinguish-
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Figure 3.17: Mean load profile for the generated dataset consisting of 266
households.
ing advantage. For better comparison, we plotted the results of the
combined decision function when applied on the Dataport dataset.
Also here, we observe no significant differences (in the distinguishing
advantage) between the generated dataset and the real dataset. Hence,
we conclude for future privacy studies on real world data, generated
datasets seem to be a very promising alternative to real world datasets,
whose availability is very limited.
3.7 chapter summary
In this chapter, we evaluated the privacy guarantees of aggregation
in smart metering. Using realistic datasets and modeling privacy as
an indistinguishability game, we showed that contrary to industrial
insights, small and medium sized aggregates can leak information
about users’ activities. Furthermore, we evaluated various parameters
of the aggregate that affect the privacy offered. We illustrated that less
frequent reports improve privacy guarantees but do not completely
eliminate the privacy danger. We further concluded that, we cannot
argue about a universal profile of household electrical consumption,
based on the datasets we studied. Last, we studied electricity con-
sumption profile generators, and we showed that in the lack of real
datasets, they can be a viable alternative.
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4.1 microdata releases and privacy
In this chapter, we focus on privacy on microdata collections. Micro-
data refers to collected statistical information about individuals; for
example, the movies that someone has watched or the pages she likes
on Facebook. This kind of statistical data regarding users is a lucrative
asset for a variety of companies and organizations, because a plethora
of information can be extracted, such as shopping trends, health or
financial indicators, etc.
Microdata pose a privacy risk in case parts of databases are compro-
mised, or even when datasets are published sanitized (i.e., anonymized)
as inadequate procedures are typically used in the anonymization pro-
cess, such as the simple removal of personal identifiable information,
i.e., names, tax IDs, etc. In a demonstration to show that these proce-
dures are not safe, a US politician was reidentified through published
anonymized health records [145], while in [115] the authors demon-
strated that half a million users of a popular movie database could be
reidentified with high accuracy.
Whenever such personal data/preferences become publicly avail-
able, individuals are affected in a variety of ways. It is known that
political orientation, sexual preferences, age, intelligence and other
personal traits can be statistically inferred with high accuracy just
by accessing someones online profile [96]. In addition, unexpected
connections in social graphs, so called weak ties, can uncover identities
and reveal sensitive data [132]. For example, if the online profiles of
two users share some common interests, we can predict traits about
one profile by having access only to the other. Additionally, a privacy
breach has implications for future privacy [115]. In a hypothetical
scenario where Alice’s identity has been revealed, she can no longer
hide behind another online account with a different nickname. Even if
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she creates a brand new account, her microdata will always identify
her.
In this chapter we develop a novel tool for individuals’ privacy
assessment based on their microdata. Similar to the previous chapter,
we measure privacy in terms of indistinguishability. However, there is
a difference. In this chapter we approximate users’ indistinguishability
in terms of their uniqueness in a database. In a nutshell, how likely
it is, that their preferences are unique and if someone knows them
(or a subset of them that is unique), they can identify them in an
pseudonymous (or anonymized) dataset. The tool approximates a
user’s privacy level and categorizes her in a privacy group ranging
from a relatively safe privacy group, where many users have similar
preferences, to a dangerous group where her data are uncommon and
hence, not many people share them.
The proposed tool measures the risk of being reidentified based on
a user’s microdata, prior to sharing their data, based on two factors:
the data the user wants to disclose to the provider and published statistics
about those data. We consider the following scenario: Alice wants to
use a service for music recommendation. However, Alice heard on the
news about recent reidentification attacks on similar services and is
worried about her online privacy. By using the proposed tool, she can
obtain an estimation and a visual representation of the risks being
reidentified based on her microdata (privacy level), without disclosing
anything to the provider. With this extra information, she no longer
has to trust the provider but can consciously decide whether she wants
to contribute her data.
The tool is composed of two instances, one for the service provider
and one for clients, and a privacy metric. On the provider’s side, the
tool clusters clients based on their microdata into privacy groups and
publishes information regarding each group. In addition, statistics
regarding the items’ popularities are published. Such kind of statistics
already exist in many services, usually in the form of “another x users
liked this item”. The users’ instance measures the privacy level of a
user, based on such published information by the provider. As a last
step, the tool provides a visual and easily comprehensible result to
the user.
Chapter outline
We proceed by reviewing related work in Section 4.2 and we describe
the tool and the privacy metric in Section 4.3. In Section 4.4, we intro-
duce the datasets used for evaluation, and present the experiments
demonstrating that our tool can capture the reidentification risk of
someone adequately, even without full access to the database. In Sec-
tion 4.5 we describe the proposed visual way in which the privacy
levels are presented to users.
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4.2 related work
4.2.1 Reidentification attacks
Various works have shown that combinations of attributes can be used
for de-anonymization. Sweeney [144] conducted experiments on the
1990 US census summary data to determine if and how combinations
of identifiers could uniquely identify people. It was shown that 87%
of the US population can be identified based on their 5-digit ZIP code,
their gender and their birth date. De Montjoye et al. [56] studied the
uniqueness of individuals in an anonymized credit card transaction
dataset using information from 1.1 million people collected over 3
months. Their experiments show that over 90% of the users can be
uniquely identified by only 4 places where they pay with their credit
cards. Furthermore, the deanonymization process becomes easier if
the adversary knows the approximate price of a transaction. The odds
of reidentification are also higher for women and for people with
high income. Solomon et al. [141] investigated individuals’ uniqueness
in high dimensional social sciences datasets, collected for medical
purposes. Their results indicate that only 3 attributes are enough to
deanonymize every participant in the dataset. The rest of the attributes
however, are rather similar indicating that aggregation techniques
based on those 3 crucial attributes could mitigate the privacy risk.
Various reidentification attacks, mostly on publicly available san-
itized datasets, demonstrate the risks involved in data publishing.
Sweeney [145] was able to identify the profile of a US governor in an
anonymized health database by combining it with a purchased voters
registration list. His profile was the only one matching the fields of
ZIP code, gender and birth date. Frankowski et al. [73] studied the
problem of linking users’ profiles between a private and a public
database. More specifically, using a popular public movies discussion
forum, they matched users to a private movie rating database using
several different algorithms. Their results portray that relationships to
items in sparse datasets can be used as quasi identifiers. Furthermore,
they studied the effects of suppression and generalization mechanisms
on the datasets. Their experiments suggest that the best strategy is
addition of noise; mentioning movies that one has not actually rated
in order to confuse the matching algorithms.
Narayanan and Shmatikov [115] presented new statistical de -
anonymization attacks against microdata datasets. Their attacks rely
on the similarities between a user’s profile and the auxiliary adver-
sarial information. In their work they showed how adversaries with
little background information and not necessarily fully correct, can
deanonymized microdata collections. By performing their attacks on
an actual dataset published by Netflix, they illustrate that as few as
5-10 attributes per user can lead to a privacy breach for thousands of
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users. Merener [113] elaborates on the algorithms used in [115]. His
research focused on the generalization of the results under general
and realistic assumptions, and presented an improved version of one
of the algorithms. In addition, he highlighted the importance of a
dataset’s sparsity in the deanonymization success and the importance
of rare items in users’ distinguishability. He evaluates the theoretical
findings by experimenting with an anonymized health dataset.
Al-Azizy et al. [32] survey data deanonymization techniques and
cluster them according to they type of auxiliary information, and the
structure of the datasets.
4.2.2 Privacy quantification
Various metrics based on data similarity have been proposed to mea-
sure privacy, independent of adversarial models. K-anonymity [145] is
a property of statistical databases. It requires that groups of at least k
entries have the same values for the quasi identifiers while all direct
identifiers have been removed. Thus, an adversary cannot uniquely iso-
late an entry but has to choose from further k-1. In order for a database
to satisfy k-anonymity, generalization or suppression mechanisms can
be used. L-diversity [109] is an extension of k-anonymity. After classes
with at least k entries have been formed, this definition aims to limit
the diversity of all created groups. It is required that each class should
contain at least l well represented sensitive values; for instance at least
l distinct values should be published per class, or the most frequent
ones. Another extension of k-anonymity is t-closeness [104]. It requires
that the distribution of sensitive values in all classes should follow
that of the general database otherwise, adversaries with auxiliary
information on the global distribution of the sensitive values, could
infer selected attributes. Hence, the distance of the distributions of
each pair of classes should be smaller by a threshold. However, due to
multidimensionality and sparsity in microdata publication, the effect
of the latter anonymization approaches and privacy metrics might be
inadequate [31].
Parra-Arnau et al. [124] proposed the use of the Kullback-Leibler
divergence, an information theoretic quantity, as a privacy metric for
profiles in personalized information systems. The motivation behind
such a proposal is that the average user profile is the one that maxi-
mizes entropy. Hence, any deviation from such a profile can be viewed
as privacy loss. Thus, users whose profiles deviate from the average
profile are more probable to be targeted or classified by adversaries.
Differential privacy is an indistinguishability metric first proposed
for the domain of databases [63]. When a dataset is differentially
private, any result is guaranteed to be equally likely regardless of the
weight of any individual entry in the database. In other words, the
existence or not of an entry in the dataset, cannot affect the result
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of a query more than a predetermined value. Differential privacy is
usually achieved with the addition of noise in the data and comes in
two settings; an interactive and an offline. In the interactive one, users
make queries to the sanitized database until a privacy budget is fully
spend. In the offline setting the data are sanitized once and published.
A detailed analysis of the most used privacy metrics was done by
Wagner and Eckhoff [152], while a survey of privacy preserving data
publishing techniques was presented by Chen et al. [46].
Our contribution
This chapter proposes a tool for estimating users’ privacy levels based
on their shared information with their provider, and the popularity
of their items. While we do not propose any new attacks, we use the
notion of auxiliary information to simulate an attacker that tries to
match this information against entries in the database. Contrary to
most proposed privacy metrics, the one developed in this chapter does
not require full access to the providers’ databases and other people’s
profiles. However, due to that, the privacy result is an approximation
of the users’ actual privacy rather than an exact estimation.
4.3 privacy assessment mechanism
4.3.1 Overview of the system
An overview of the proposed system in presented in Figure 4.1. The
purpose of the tool is to allow users to estimate their privacy level
(i.e., their reidentification risk) before using an online service where
microdata might be collected. In order to do so, the provider needs to
create privacy groups, based on his existing clients, using our proposed
metric (Figure 4.1: A). These groups consist of users whose risk of
reidentification is on roughly the same level. In addition, the provider
publishes statistics regarding the popularity of all items (Figure 4.1: B).
On the client’s side, the tool estimates the privacy score using those
public statistics and his microdata (Figure 4.1: C and D). Finally, the
user gets a visual representation of his privacy level, illustrating the
privacy group in which he was categorized.
4.3.2 System’s internal logic
4.3.2.1 Privacy metric
The tool requires a metric that can estimate individuals’ privacy level
locally, using minimal information from the provider. Hence, the need
for a new privacy metric arises, as existing metrics used in databases
are not applicable due to two reasons. First, we work with providers
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Figure 4.1: The two parts of our system. The database instance, publishes
popularity statistics for all items. In addition, using our metric
it classifies existing users to groups of privacy. The client’s part
of our system receives those statistics and calculates the user’s
privacy score.
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that store microdata, characterized by sparsity and high dimensionality.
Hence, combinations of even popular choices might identify clients.
Second, all of the proposed metrics require access to other user’s
profiles in the database, in order to compute a privacy score, which is
not possible in a setting where the score is computed at the client’s
side. We identify the following requirements for a new privacy metric
necessary for our tool:
• It should rely on the user’s preferences for computations,
• be lightweight, in order to be computed on user’s devices, and
• require minimum information from the provider’s side.
Re-enforcing previous insights, we know that rare items contribute to
the distinguishability of users [113], as some combinations of items can
directly identify them (e.g., items preferred by just one user). The total
amount of items, however, also play a significant role on the distin-
guishability of users. Individuals with many items can have more iden-
tifying combinations, which they enable their de-anonymization [73,
115]. We combine those two factors in a privacy metric. After extensive
testing, we identify the following formula as the most promising in
capturing the reidentification risk using only information from the
user’s side and popularity statistics about the items:
privacy_score =
all− popular
all
+ ln(all). (4.1)
Here, all refers to the total amount of items the user has, while popular
refers to the number of his popular items. In our experiments an item
is considered as rare if it had less than 100 users interacting with it,
otherwise we consider it as popular. Since we have only two categories,
all-popular equals the number of rare items. An immediate observation
is that there might be cases where the second part of the formula
dominates the first with the logarithm ranging on any positive integer
while the fraction (first component) ranges to [0, 1]. However, in reality
user do not have that many items and the logarithm provides a strong
upper bound. For comparison, in our experiments the logarithmic part
of the formula, ranges from 1 to 6.9, reaching the maximum value only
for the case of users with 1,000 items in their profile (only 10 people
out of 30,000, see figure 4.2). The first part of the equation however,
is needed in order to cover the (many) cases of users which have just
a handful of items available at their profile. Because of the limited
information available on their profiles, the ratio of rare items is the
major identifying factor, instead of the possible combination of their
(few) items. A second observation is that our metric may discourage
early adopters, as the normalization parameters would be misleading
if the database is almost empty (i.e., a fresh system). However, we
argue that if a provider would publish a sanitized database for research
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purposes it would make sure that it offers some utility to researchers,
something that an empty database is lacking. Hence, even in the case
where early adopters receive incorrect privacy scores, as the database
gets populated, their system would be able to correctly calculate their
privacy level.
4.3.2.2 Algorithms
The system consists of two components: (a) The database instance
located at the provider and (b) the user instance located on clients’
devices.
Database instance. We represent a database of microdata as N x M
matrix. We assume that every row in the database is a profile p ∈ P,
where P denotes the collection of users, while every column denotes
an item.
The algorithm running on the provider is presented in Algorithm 1.
The provider first calculates the popularity of all items (line 2), based
on how many users have interacted with them, and groups the items
into two major categories, “popular” and “rare”, in line 3.
After creating the two categories based on items’ popularities, the
provider starts calculating the privacy score according to Equation (4.1)
for all existing clients in his database, as seen in line 4. For every user,
the tool finds the total amount of items and the amount of items
categorized as popular (lines 5 and 6). In line 7, the privacy score for
each user is calculated. The lowest and highest scores of all users are
found in lines 8 and 9. Then, these scores are used to normalize every
user’s score to the interval [0,1] (lines 10 and 11). In the remainder
of this chapter, we refer to those two values as the “normalization
parameters”. A score of 1 indicates the most private user.
In lines 12 and 13, we cluster all users according to their privacy
score. For the clustering process, we use the X-means algorithm [125],
which is an extended k-means algorithm that automatically determines
the optimal number of clusters based on the Bayesian Information
Criterion (BIC) scores. Even though we use an automated process
to define the number of clusters (hence the number of the privacy
groups), they can also be selected by the provider by substituting the
X-means algorithm with any other clustering method. Noise reduction
is performed on the clusters by filtering out the top and bottom 5% of
every group’s users, leading to higher intra cluster similarity without
the effect of outliers (line 13).
In lines 14 - 16, the popularity of all items, the normalization pa-
rameters, as well as the centroids of each cluster (privacy groups) are
published. The popularity can be published in a variety of ways de-
pending on the provider’s policy. Those include, charts with the items
popularity, colored indicators next to each item name or, as common
in many websites, quotes that refer to the number of customers that
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interacted with the item. We propose the provider to publish popu-
larity information regarding all items, and not just communicate the
required ones to new customers, in order to avoid inference attacks
based on the information provided. The provider will periodically run
the above procedure due to the dynamic nature of the service, as new
items and clients are added on a frequent basis.
Algorithm 1 Provider’s algorithm
1: procedure Privacy_Groups
2: find_item_popularities()
3: group_items_to_bins() . based on their popularity
4: for p inP do
5: all← number_of_all_user_items()
6: popular← number_of_popular_user_items()
7: privacy[p]← all− popular
all
+ ln(all)
8: most_prv← max(privacy) . most private user
9: least_prv← min(privacy) . least private user
10: for p inP do . normalize score
11: privacy[p]← 1− p− least_prv
most_prv− least_prv
12: (centroids,clusters)← run_clustering(P)
13: centroids← reduce_noise_in_clusters()
14: publish_item_popularities()
15: publish_centroids_of_privacy_groups()
16: publish_norm_parameters() . max and min privacy scores
User instance. The tool on the clients’ side locally computes the pri-
vacy score of the user, hereby using the published information from
the provider. Following Algorithm 2, it receives from the provider the
popularity of all items in the database, the normalization parameters,
and the centroids of the privacy groups (lines 2 - 4). The tool then com-
putes the privacy score, based on the items the user wants to disclose
to the provider in line 5, using Equation (4.1), and then normalizes the
score in line 6 using the normalization parameters. Using the privacy
score and the centroids of each cluster, in line 7, the tool classifies the
user in one of the existing privacy groups. The visual result is finally
displayed to the client, as seen in line 8.
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Algorithm 2 User’s algorithm
1: procedure Find_Privacy_Score
2: receive_item_popularities()
3: receive_centroids()
4: (least_prv,most_prv)← receive_norm_parameters()
5: privacy_score← all− popular
all
+ ln(all)
6: privacy_score← 1− privacy_score− least_prv
most_prv− least_prv
7: find_privacy_group(privacy_score, centroids)
8: present_visual_result(privacy_score)
4.4 evaluation
4.4.1 Datasets
We evaluate the tool using two actual and one generated (from actual
data nevertheless) datasets in order to approximate realistic condition.
We use the following datasets in our evaluation:
Yahoo! Music.1 This dataset represents a snapshot of the Yahoo!
Music community’s preferences for various songs. The dataset contains
over 717 million ratings of 136 thousand songs given by 1.8 million
users of Yahoo! Music services. The data was collected between 2002
and 2006.
Yahoo! Movies.1 This dataset contains a small sample of the Yahoo!
Movies community’s preferences for various movies. Users are repre-
sented by numerical pseudonyms, so that no identifying information
is revealed. User ratings are on a scale from A+ to F.
Netflix. 2 Netflix is an entertainment company providing video on
demand. However, during the time of this dataset collection Netflix
was mostly active in online DVD rental. The dataset was released
for research purposes and more precisely, to support participants in
the Netflix Prize contest. It is a fraction of the original dataset and it
contains ratings between December 1999 and December 2005 from a
huge community, numbering more than 480 thousand subscribers, 100
million ratings and over 17 thousand items.
Due to increased execution time, we randomly sampled the original
Yahoo! datasets, and work with subsets. However, this does not affect
the quality of our experiments: there is theoretical evidence that ran-
dom sampling of a database has the same sparseness as the original
[115]. Hence, sparseness, crucial for privacy in microdata publication,
is not affected due to our sampling method. Additionally, we did
1 https://webscope.sandbox.yahoo.com
2 http://www.netflixprize.com/faq.html
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Table 4.1: Statistics of datasets. The datasets presented are randomly sampled
from the original datasets and without outliers.
Users Ratings Items Items/User
Netflix 9,938 426,639 1,763 38.5
Yahoo! Music 13,265 1,190,496 13,630 79.9
Yahoo! Movies 7,626 201,579 11,916 26.6
not have access to the original Netflix dataset as it is not anymore
available from the provider. For this reason we used parts of it, avail-
able from other sources online. Even though this dataset might not be
representative of the original collection, is still useful in our case.
For the remainder of this chapter, whenever a dataset is mentioned
with its name, it will refer to the subset created for the experiments.
For the evaluation we first sampled the original datasets and then
excluded users which were considered as outliers (incomplete profiles
with less that 8 items or users with more than 5 thousands items). In
Table 4.1, we summarize the datasets used in this work. In Figure 4.2
we plot the amount of items per user profile for all datasets. On the
x axis, the users are sorted descending according to the amount of
items they have in their profile, while the y axis indicates the amount
of items. Both axes are in logarithmic scale. In Figure 4.3, we plot
the amount of users that have interacted with each item. The items
for each dataset are sorted descending on the x axis, while the y axis
indicates the number of users. Again, both axes are in logarithmic
scale. It is clear from Table 4.1 and Figures 4.2 and 4.3, that the datasets
are significantly different. Yahoo!-Music users have on average more
items per profile, than the rest of the datasets. Yahoo! Movies has both
the lowest average amount of items per profile and the lowest ratio
of items per profile against all the items in a dataset, which is 0.2%.
For comparison, the ratio for Netflix is 2.18% and 0.5% for Yahoo!-
Music. Regarding the item’s popularities in Figure 4.3, we observe
that the Yahoo! Movies dataset has 50 items that are preferred by more
than 1000 users. The Yahoo! Music dataset however, has an order of
magnitude more items (500), that are preferred by more than 1000
users.
4.4.2 Designing the experiments
In order to establish a ground truth to validate our metric, we perform
simulations of data breaches on all datasets. For this reason, we assume
a realistic attacker that has auxiliary information for every user and
tries to reidentify them in a published pseudonymous dataset. The
adversarial tactic in this case, is to match the auxiliary information
to users’ stored microdata. Such an attacker can be anyone who 1)
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Figure 4.2: Number of items in user profiles. Users are represented by con-
secutive ids on the x axis. They are sorted descending, according
to the amount of items in their profiles. The number of items is
displayed on the y axis. Both axes are in logarithmic scale.
has access to such a published database and 2) has in any way, from
personal conversation or third sources, obtained some information
about some of the user’s preferences. The Anonymity Set (AS) of
a user consists of all profiles that match the adversary’s auxiliary
information regarding that user. After each deanonymization attempt,
every user has an anonymity set 1 6 |AS| 6 |P|, where |AS| = 1
suggests that the attack was successful. In case where |AS| 6= 1, the
adversary cannot select the correct profile from the ASwith probability
higher than 1/|AS|. Hence, bigger anonymity sets mean that the user
is more private. The average size of the AS is a good estimate of the
users’ privacy, since profiles that are extremely common and identical
with many others, do not enhance the adversary’s knowledge. To use
the minimum or maximum |AS|, instead of the average size of the
AS, would be too optimistic or pessimistic, respectively, because those
events can be seldom.
4.4.2.1 Adversarial model
In our effort to simulate a realistic adversary, we assume that he has
information regarding the existence of several items in every user’s
profile. In this study, we consider adversaries that are able to find
information about individuals and then try to enrich their knowledge
about them. The auxiliary information (the adversary’s information)
corresponds to 5%-20% of randomly selected items per profile. The
adversary attempts to find all profiles in the sanitized database that
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Figure 4.3: Items’ popularity. Items are represented by consecutive ids on
the x axis. They are sorted descending, according to how many
users have interacted with every item. On the y axis, the amount
of users is displayed. Both axes are in logarithmic scale.
match his auxiliary information, hoping that only one profile will be
returned, the one that he was looking for.
4.4.2.2 Methodology
We perform Monte Carlo simulation of n = 10000 deanonymization
attacks for all users in the datasets. For every user in every round, we
select randomly a number between 5-20, denoting the percentage of
the adversary’s auxiliary information regarding that user. Then, we
randomly sample the user’s profile for that amount of items. Using this
information, we query the database and save the amount of the profiles
returned, which is the anonymity set for that user in the specific round.
We then average the results of all rounds for each user, in order to
estimate the average |AS|. Considering the minimum or the maximum
|AS|, would not serve the purpose of approximating individual’s
privacy level as they would give us the lowest and upper bounds
of privacy. We also note, that the above comparison demonstrates
the tool’s ability to classify users into privacy groups. We do not
propose any privacy defense or suggest whether the users should
or should not share their data with the service provider. Hence, the
de-anonymization attack cannot be optimized given the adversarial
knowledge about such a tool.
As mentioned in Section 4.3.2.2, we separate the items in two pop-
ularity categories. For every profile in all datasets, we calculate the
privacy score based on our metric. Following the algorithm on the
94 measuring privacy in high dimensional microdata collections
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400
anonymity set
−0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
pri
va
cy
sco
re
not safe
medium risk
safe
Figure 4.4: Scatter plot portraying the correlation between the average
anonymity set and the privacy score for Yahoo! Movies. The
x axis displays the average |AS| for every user, while the y axis
the privacy score returned from our metric. Different colors and
markers denote the privacy groups returned from our tool. The
black stars on the left of the figure are the centroids of the privacy
groups. The dashed black lines separate the privacy groups.
provider’s side (Algorithm 1), we cluster the profiles based on their
privacy score and perform the noise reduction technique.
4.4.3 Validity of the model
In Figures 4.4 to 4.6, we present the correlation between our privacy
metric and |AS|, as well as the clustering results for all datasets.
On the x axis we present the average anonymity set for every user,
while on the y axis the score of our privacy metric. We plot with
different colors and markers the resulting privacy groups. For all three
datasets, our algorithm returned three privacy groups. Those are the
“not safe”, “medium risk” and “safe”. The dashed horizontal lines are
the borders between the privacy groups. The lines correspond to the
lowest and highest score of each cluster. A black star in the central left
part of every cluster denotes the cluster’s centroid (calculated solely
based only on the privacy score, see lines 11-12 in Alg. 1).
On all datasets, our metric has a strong positive correlation with
the anonymity set. More precisely, we measure the correlation using
Spearman’s rank correlation, as well as with Kendall’s rank correlation.
The Spearman’s correlation is a nonparametric measure of the rank
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Figure 4.5: Similar to Figure 4.4, this scatter plot is showing the correlation
between the average anonymity set and our privacy score for the
Yahoo! Music dataset, as well as the resulting privacy groups.
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Figure 4.6: Scatter plot displaying the correlation between the average
anonymity set and our privacy score for Netflix, similar to Fig-
ures 4.4 and 4.5.
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Table 4.2: Correlation coefficients for Spearman’s and Kendall’s correlation.
The compared variables are the average anonymity set for each
user and his privacy score based on our metric.
Spearman’s Correlation Kendall’s Correlation
Netflix 0.83 0.65
Yahoo!-Music 0.91 0.73
Yahoo!-Movies 0.84 0.64
correlation between two variables (in our case the average |AS| per
user and his privacy score). It estimates how well the relationship
of the two variables is described by a monotonic function. Kendall’s
correlation is also a non parametric measure, and assesses the ordinal
association between two variables. We present the results in Table 4.2.
It is worth mentioning that for all correlations, the p-values of the null
hypothesis were zero. This is known to happen in big datasets, with
sizes bigger than a few hundred entries. However, a visual examination
of the scatter plots (Figures 4.4 to 4.6) illustrates that the data are not
random, but follow a pattern. Thus, the correlation coefficient scores,
as well as the p-values, are trustworthy.
Figures 4.4 to 4.6 clearly show that our tool correctly separates
users into privacy groups based on their privacy score. The smaller
|AS| for the “safe” category range from 50 (Yahoo! Movies) to 200
(Netflix). According to our metric, the scores of the least private
users in this category had a score of 0.9 (Yahoo! Movies) and 0.83
(Netflix). The “not safe” group on all datasets includes users who
have anonymity sets ranging from 1 (successful reidentification) to
50 (2% chance for successful reidentification) and privacy scores of
less than 0.7. However, the anonymity set for the “safe” group on all
datasets, ranges in value from 50 (worst case in our experiments) to
a few thousands. This happens because users with just a few items
(lower risk of reidentification) represent a big part of the database
population. Those users, depending on the amount of rare movies
they have, have anonymity sets that are significantly different. Users
that are in the “safe” group, have low reidentification chances ranging
from 2% (|AS| = 50) to 0.045% (|AS| = 2200).
On all three privacy groups we observe some small overlaps, with
regard to the anonymity set, with the next group. This happens be-
cause we evaluate real datasets and we rely on probabilistic attacks to
create the anonymity sets. However, the majority of the points lay in
different AS ranges, depending the privacy group. For example, on the
Yahoo! Music dataset (Figure 4.5), most of the profiles characterized
as “safe” are in the AS range of 180 to 1400. Even though a few of
the safe profiles are in the range of 180 to 230, where many profiles
of the “medium-risk” group are located, they are outliers and do not
represent the main mass of the group. In addition, the overlapping
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ranges are always on the “more private” side of the anonymity set
(larger anonymity sets) where one group fades out and the next one
starts.
4.5 privacy thermometer
As in this chapter we proposed a tool that is user centric, we also
need to focus on its usability. For this reason, we choose to display
the privacy levels to the user in a visual, easily comprehensible way.
Our goal is to enable non-experts to use privacy measurements tools.
Hence, complicated scores and definitions should be avoided.
In our attempt to find a way to visualize the resulting privacy level,
we identify the following requirements:
• The presentation should avoid the use of numerical scores as
they might be confusing,
• preferably it should use colored indicators because they are
easily comprehensible and
• ideally, it should relate to a visualization that consumers are
already familiar with.
For these reasons we decided to borrow the successful design of the
European energy efficiency label (Figure 4.7), which was introduced
by the EU Directive 92/75/EC in 1992.
Figure 4.7: EU energy efficiency label.
This label belongs in the family of comparative labels [135], that
allow users to compare devices based on a common characteristic
(in this tool users would compare with other users based on their
privacy levels). The privacy levels consists of colored indicators in the
form of bars. The bars correspond to the privacy groups created on
the provider’s side. The colors range from red to dark green, with
red denoting the worst privacy group while dark green is the best.
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The bars have different lengths with the longest one being the red
bar, denoting the highest reidentification risk. All of the bars in our
label are used to represent privacy groups (closed alphabetic scale)
and there are no unused bars left for future groups (open alphabetic
scale). According to research, open alphabetic labels, which would
allow for future bars (i.e., more energy efficient devices or in our case,
more privacy groups), are harder for consumers to understand than
closed alphabetic scales [65]. In addition, our decision to display verbal
indicators to each bar instead of numerical has a two fold advantage.
According to [65], consumers understand better alphabetic scales
than numeric ones. Furthermore, in one of the earliest experiments
regarding energy labels, Chestnut [48] found that verbal ratings are
effective for long-term storage of consumer information. Hence, this
design enhances our effort in raising privacy awareness, as consumers
will be more likely to remember their privacy scores long after they
have been displayed to them.
In Figure 4.8, we give an example of how a privacy label would look
for the Netflix dataset. In order to provide more granular information
to clients we split the “medium safe” and “safe” group into two
categories, depending on the privacy score. Hence, the privacy label
for Netflix has five privacy bars denoting each one of the privacy
groups.
Figure 4.8: Example of privacy label for the Netflix dataset.
4.6 chapter summary
In this chapter, we focused on microdata collections. We developed a
tool that approximates users’ privacy levels based on their microdata.
This procedure happens before users decide to share their preferences
with a service provider, in order to empower them towards privacy
conscious decisions. We evaluated the tool using actual user data
published online, and highlighted that it can correctly classify users’
to privacy groups.
5
C O N C L U S I O N
In this thesis, we have studied the problem of quantifying privacy. We
developed privacy metrics and tools in order to show that current
privacy protection mechanisms are either insufficient or need careful
planning before deployment. Furthermore, our tools and metrics en-
able users, providers or application developers to better understand
the privacy risks and implication of their data.
In Chapter 2 we identified an unexplored space in the location
privacy literature, that is of practical relevance for many new applica-
tions. We conducted the first study on privacy implications of mobile
crowdsourcing (MCS) applications. We begun by confirming, using
data available from real MCS, that this data enables the inference of
users’ sensitive information (e.g., workplaces, social relationships, or
persistent habits). The results on an indicative sample of users indi-
cated that we could infer a user’s work place with up to 32% success
rate and her social relationships with 21% success. Furthermore, since
one of the datasets under investigation was anonymized, we described
the deanonymization procedure using heuristics and illustrated how
the available information can still be used to isolate individuals.
Then, we studied the applicability of well-established location pri-
vacy defenses created for location-based services (LBSs). We show
that neither the location privacy and utility metrics typically found
in the literature nor the existing privacy-preserving mechanisms are
well-suited for the MCS case. On the one hand, given the persistent
patterns stemming from continuous collection, these solutions provide
less privacy than in the case of LBSs where locations are revealed once.
On the other hand, the existing mechanisms are optimized to provide
utility regarding the location of the users, but MCS applications rely
on measurements associated to these locations, or on some function of
the locations. Therefore, state-of-the-art defenses have a detrimental
impact on MCS utility.
Finally, we closed this chapter by describing how the attacks, privacy
metrics and defenses proposed throughout this chapter have been
composed to a tool and we provided some best practices guidelines
for MCS application developers.
In Chapter 3, we investigated privacy in smart meter aggregation.
Even though smart meter aggregation is technically solved, it remained
an open research question whether small or medium sized aggregates
provide sufficient privacy. We proposed a privacy metric in the form
of a cryptographic game to examine the degree in which aggregates
offer privacy. In order to distinguish single profiles in the aggregates
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we shy away from machine learning algorithms and we rely on simple
statistical attacks. Our choice is deliberate as our goal is to examine
whether even non-sophisticated adversarial practices could succeed.
We begun our research by investigating whether single households
are identifiable in the aggregates. The results are alarming, indicating
that individual load profiles are distinguishable in aggregates of up to
258 other households, with 10% success rate. This rate goes up to 70%,
when only a handful of load profiles are aggregated. Besides detecting
households, single appliances can also be inferred. By experimenting
with various devices, we showed how they can be detected with 10%
success rate in aggregates of up to 20 households.
We further examined how various parameters such as the time
of the day and the temporal resolution affect privacy. As expected,
more frequent reports provide higher adversarial advantage but even
infrequent reports (one every half hour) still do not provide sufficient
privacy. Overall, even though fixing an acceptable privacy loss (advan-
tage as defined in this chapter) is more a philosophical question rather
than a purely technical one, it becomes obvious that an aggregation
size in the single digit range seems to be far from being sufficient
to provide privacy when assuming a short reporting interval. Even
worse, it is safe to assume that the privacy leakage is notably higher
in practice than in the specific model presented. This is due to the
fact that energy suppliers continuously record consumption informa-
tion. Consequently, periodical behavior of households inhabitants (e.g.,
sleep cycle) will inevitably leak to the supplier.
Even though we experimented with simple statistical techniques
to distinguish individual households, our results barely scratch the
surface of the danger. This chapter aimed to rather illustrate the danger
than providing really effective attacks. It remains an open question, to
what degree other techniques break indistinguishability in even larger
aggregates. Furthermore, a privacy-utility trade off analysis, using
actual utility functions from providers, would help to establish a more
clear picture of the required amount of smart meters in aggregates
and the maximum tolerable noise from the service provider.
The last part of this thesis investigated privacy in microdata pub-
lication. Motivated by recent deanonymization attacks and focusing
primarily on users’ empowerment, we address the issue of estimating
privacy levels with minimal information from the provider’s side.
More precisely, in Chapter 4, we proposed a user-centric tool that can
measure user privacy levels without access to the service provider’s
database. We described the underlying algorithm and the privacy met-
ric that relies on user’s data. We instantiated the tool and used it to
acquire the privacy level of all users on three datasets. We performed
de-anonymization attacks on all users based on some background
information derived from the datasets, and calculated their average
anonymity set. We illustrated the tool’s ability to create privacy danger
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groups by comparing the average anonymity set per user with the
tool’s result. Finally, we proposed an easy visualization of the privacy
level to avoid complex privacy definitions to non-expert users.
Concluding, in this thesis we have demonstrated that privacy is
a complex and domain dependent goal. We illustrated that existing
privacy preserving mechanisms developed for a single domain, can-
not be directly applied to others. This extends even to cases where
the collected data are of similar nature (Chapter 2), as the collection
process, as well as the utility functions evaluated over the collected
data, are crucial factors in selecting a privacy mechanism. We also
illustrated that fine tuning a privacy mechanism and making sure that
private information is not leaked, while maintaining reasonable utility,
is not trivial. Chapters 2 and 3 clearly show how the naive application
of privacy mechanisms, or not considering the utility functions of the
specific tasks, can have a negative impact in either users’ privacy or
the applications’ utility. Generalizing, a careful analysis of the existing
privacy mechanisms, the nature of the collected data and the impact of
those on the utility are necessary for the successful application of pri-
vacy enhancing technologies. For all the aforementioned domains, we
developed novel privacy metrics to empower users, service providers
and application developers. Furthermore, we illustrated how our met-
rics can be converted to tools to empower users in privacy aware
decisions, enable service providers for more privacy friendly data
collection and guide application developers towards privacy aware
development of platforms. We believe that the proposed and/or pub-
lished tools, based on understandable utility and privacy metrics, can
serve as a starting point for all stakeholders when selecting privacy
configurations and can enable further research into privacy enhancing
technologies.

B I B L I O G R A P H Y
[1] url: https://www.spotteron.net/apps.
[2] url: https://www.openstreetmap.org.
[3] url: https://www.mapillary.com.
[4] url: https://www.opencellid.org.
[5] url: https://radiocells.org.
[6] url: https://location.services.mozilla.com.
[7] url: https://www.skyhookwireless.com.
[8] url: https://opensignal.com/.
[9] url: https://www.sensorly.com.
[10] url: http://www.cellumap.com.
[11] url: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.
opensignal.weathersignal.
[12] url: https://www.waze.com.
[13] url: https://www.qualcomm.com/solutions/automotive/
drive-data-platform.
[14] url: https://www.gokamino.com.
[15] url: http://www.app-store.es/stereopublic.
[16] url: https://blog.safecast.org.
[17] url: https://support.google.com/wifi/answer/6246642.
[18] url: https://privacy.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-10-
location-and-privacy.
[19] url: https : / / www . wired . com / story / strava - heat - map -
military-bases-fitness-trackers-privacy/.
[20] url: https://www.bellingcat.com/resources/articles/
2018 / 07 / 08 / strava - polar - revealing - homes - soldiers -
spies/.
[21] url: http://www.whosdrivingyou.org/blog/ubers-deleted-
rides-of-glory-blog-post.
[22] url: https://radiocells.org/geolocation.
[23] url: https://developer.mapquest.com/documentation.
[24] url: https://github.com/SpatialVision/differential_
privacy.
[25] url: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fukushima_Daiichi _
nuclear_disaster.
103
104 bibliography
[26] url: http://earthpy.org/interpolation_between_grids_
with_ckdtree.html.
[27] url: http://www.gqelectronicsllc.com/GMC_Safty_Guide.
jpg.
[28] url: www.loadprofilegenerator.de.
[29] Gergely Ács, Gergely Biczók, and Claude Castelluccia. “Privacy-
preserving release of spatio-temporal density.” In: Handbook of
Mobile Data Privacy. Springer, 2018, pp. 307–335.
[30] Gergely Ács and Claude Castelluccia. “I have a dream! (Differ-
entially private smart metering).” In: International Workshop on
Information Hiding. Springer, 2011, pp. 118–132.
[31] Charu C Aggarwal. “On k-anonymity and the curse of dimen-
sionality.” In: International Conference on Very Large Databases.
VLDB Endowment. 2005, pp. 901–909.
[32] Dalal Al-Azizy, David Millard, Iraklis Symeonidis, Kieron
O’Hara, and Nigel Shadbolt. “A literature survey and classifica-
tions on data deanonymisation.” In: International Conference on
Risks and Security of Internet and Systems. Springer. 2015, pp. 36–
51.
[33] Miguel E Andrés, Nicolás E Bordenabe, Konstantinos Chatziko
kolakis, and Catuscia Palamidessi. “Geo-indistinguishability:
Differential privacy for location-based systems.” In: Conference
on Computer and Communications Security. ACM. 2013, pp. 901–
914.
[34] Enrique Estellés Arolas and Fernando González-Ladrón-de-
Guevara. “Towards an integrated crowdsourcing definition.”
In: Journal of Information Science 38 (2012), pp. 189–200.
[35] Michael Backes and Sebastian Meiser. “Differentially private
smart metering with battery recharging.” In: Data Privacy Man-
agement and Autonomous Spontaneous Security. Springer, 2014,
pp. 194–212.
[36] Michael Backes, Mathias Humbert, Jun Pang, and Yang Zhang.
“walk2friends: Inferring social links from mobility profiles.”
In: Conference on Computer and Communications Security. ACM.
2017, pp. 1943–1957.
[37] Bhuvan Bamba, Ling Liu, Péter Pesti, and Ting Wang. “Sup-
porting anonymous location queries in mobile environments
with privacygrid.” In: International Conference on World Wide
Web. ACM, 2008, pp. 237–246.
bibliography 105
[38] Sean Barker, Aditya Mishra, David Irwin, Emmanuel Cecchet,
Prashant Shenoy, and Jeannie Albrecht. “Smart*: An open data
set and tools for enabling research in sustainable homes.” In:
ACM Workshop on Data Mining Applications in Sustainability 111
(2012), p. 112.
[39] Nipun Batra, Jack Kelly, Oliver Parson, Haimonti Dutta, William
J. Knottenbelt, Alex Rogers, Amarjeet Singh, and Mani B. Sri-
vastava. “NILMTK: an open source toolkit for non-intrusive
load monitoring.” In: International Conference on Future Energy
Systems. ACM, 2014, pp. 265–276.
[40] Christian Beckel, Wilhelm Kleiminger, Romano Cicchetti, Thor
sten Staake, and Silvia Santini. “The ECO data set and the
performance of non-intrusive load monitoring algorithms.”
In: Conference on Embedded Systems for Energy-Efficient Buildings.
ACM, 2014, pp. 80–89.
[41] Vincent Bindschaedler and Reza Shokri. “Synthesizing plau-
sible privacy-preserving location traces.” In: Symposium on
Security and Privacy. IEEE, 2016, pp. 546–563.
[42] J. M. Bohli, C. Sorge, and O. Ugus. “A privacy model for
smart metering.” In: International Conference on Communications
Workshops. IEEE, 2010, pp. 1–5.
[43] Lucie Bohmova and Antonin Pavlicek. “The influence of social
networking sites on recruiting human resources in the Czech
Republic.” In: Organizacija 48.1 (2015), pp. 23–31.
[44] Konstantinos Chatzikokolakis, Ehab Elsalamouny, and Catus-
cia Palamidessi. “Efficient utility improvement for location
privacy.” In: Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies. De
Gruyter Open, 2017, pp. 308–328.
[45] Konstantinos Chatzikokolakis, Catuscia Palamidessi, and Marco
Stronati. “A predictive differentially-private mechanism for mo-
bility traces.” In: Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies.
De Gruyter Open, 2014, pp. 21–41.
[46] Bee-Chung Chen, Daniel Kifer, Kristen LeFevre, and Ashwin
Machanavajjhala. “Privacy-preserving data publishing.” In:
Foundations and Trends in Databases 2 (2009), pp. 1–167.
[47] Rui Chen, Gergely Ács, and Claude Castelluccia. “Differen-
tially private sequential data publication via variable-length
n-grams.” In: Conference on Computer and Communications Secu-
rity. ACM, 2012, pp. 638–649.
[48] Robert W. Chestnut. “The Impact of Energy-Efficiency Rat-
ings: Selective vs. Elaborative Encoding.” In: Purdue Papers in
Consumer Psychology 160 (1976).
106 bibliography
[49] Tat Wing Chim, Siu-Ming Yiu, Lucas CK Hui, and Victor OK
Li. “PASS: Privacy-preserving authentication scheme for smart
grid network.” In: International Conference on Smart Grid Com-
munications. IEEE, 2011, pp. 196–201.
[50] Sung-Bae Cho. “Exploiting machine learning techniques for
location recognition and prediction with smartphone logs.” In:
Elsevier Neurocomputing 176 (2016), pp. 98–106.
[51] Thomas McIntyre Cooley. A treatise on the law of torts. Vol. 2.
Callaghan, 1930.
[52] Leon Cooper and I Norman Katz. “The Weber problem revis-
ited.” In: Pergamon Computers & Mathematics with Applications 7
(1981), pp. 225–234.
[53] Robert M Corless, Gaston H Gonnet, David EG Hare, David J
Jeffrey, and Donald E Knuth. “On the LambertW function.”
In: Springer Advances in Computational Mathematics 5 (1996),
pp. 329–359.
[54] David J Crandall, Lars Backstrom, Dan Cosley, Siddharth Suri,
Daniel Huttenlocher, and Jon Kleinberg. “Inferring social ties
from geographic coincidences.” In: Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 107 (2010),
pp. 22436–22441.
[55] George Danezis, Cédric Fournet, Markulf Kohlweiss, and San-
tiago Zanella-Béguelin. “Smart meter aggregation via secret-
sharing.” In: Workshop on Smart Energy Grid Security. ACM.
2013, pp. 75–80.
[56] Yves-Alexandre De Montjoye, Laura Radaelli, Vivek Kumar
Singh, et al. “Unique in the shopping mall: On the reidentifia-
bility of credit card metadata.” In: Science 347 (2015), pp. 536–
539.
[57] Yves-Alexandre De Montjoye, César A Hidalgo, Michel Ver-
leysen, and Vincent D Blondel. “Unique in the crowd: The
privacy bounds of human mobility.” In: Scientific Reports 3
(2013), p. 1376.
[58] Deloitte. The three billion, Enterprice crowdsourcing and the grow-
ing fragmentation of work. url: https://www2.deloitte.com/
content/dam/Deloitte/de/Documents/Innovation/us-cons-
enterprise - crowdsourcing - and - growing - fragmentation -
of-work%20(3).pdf.
[59] Daniel Demmler, Thomas Schneider, and Michael Zohner.
“ABY-A Framework for Efficient Mixed-Protocol Secure Two-
Party Computation.” In: Network and Distributed System Security
Symposium. 2015.
bibliography 107
[60] Roy Dong, Alvaro A Cárdenas, Lillian J Ratliff, Henrik Ohlsson,
and S Shankar Sastry. “Quantifying the utility-privacy tradeoff
in the smart grid.” In: arXiv preprint arXiv:1406.2568 (2014).
[61] Kostas Drakonakis, Panagiotis Ilia, Sotiris Ioannidis, and Ja-
son Polakis. “Please Forget Where I Was Last Summer: The
Privacy Risks of Public Location (Meta) Data.” In: Network and
Distributed System Security Symposium. 2019.
[62] Greg Durrett, Jonathan K. Kummerfeld, Taylor Berg-Kirkpatrick,
Rebecca S. Portnoff, Sadia Afroz, Damon McCoy, Kirill Levchenko,
and Vern Paxson. “Identifying Products in Online Cybercrime
Marketplaces: A Dataset for Fine-grained Domain Adaptation.”
In: Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Process-
ing. 2017, pp. 2598–2607.
[63] Cynthia Dwork and Aaron Roth. “The algorithmic foundations
of differential privacy.” In: Foundations and Trends in Theoretical
Computer Science 9 (2014), pp. 211–407.
[64] Nathan Eagle, Alex Sandy Pentland, and David Lazer. “In-
ferring friendship network structure by using mobile phone
data.” In: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America 106 (2009), pp. 15274–15278.
[65] London Economics. “Study on the impact of the energy label-
and potential changes to it-on consumer understanding and
on purchase decisions.” In: London Economics and Ipsos for the
European Commission, Brussels (2014).
[66] Hariton Efstathiades, Demetris Antoniades, George Pallis, and
Marios D. Dikaiakos. “Identification of Key Locations Based
on Online Social Network Activity.” In: International Conference
on Advances in Social Network Analysis and Mining. ACM, 2015,
pp. 218–225.
[67] Costas Efthymiou and Georgios Kalogridis. “Smart grid privacy
via anonymization of smart metering data.” In: Conference on
Smart Grid Communications. IEEE, 2010, pp. 238–243.
[68] Günther Eibl and Dominik Engel. “Differential privacy for real
smart metering data.” In: Springer Computer Science - Research
and Development (2016), pp. 1–10.
[69] Martin Ester, Hans-Peter Kriegel, Jörg Sander, and Xiaowei
Xu. “A density-based algorithm for discovering clusters in
large spatial databases with noise.” In: International Conference
on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining. AAAI Press, 1996,
pp. 226–231.
[70] Kassem Fawaz and Kang G Shin. “Location privacy protection
for smartphone users.” In: Conference on Computer and Commu-
nications Security. ACM, 2014, pp. 239–250.
108 bibliography
[71] H Simo Fhom, Nicolai Kuntze, Carsten Rudolph, Marco Cu-
pelli, Junqi Liu, and Antonello Monti. “A user-centric privacy
manager for future energy systems.” In: International Conference
on Power System Technology. IEEE, 2010, pp. 1–7.
[72] Forty-five Percent of Employers Use Social Networking Sites to
Research Job Candidates. url: https://www.careerbuilder.com/
share/aboutus/pressreleasesdetail.aspx?ed=12%2F31%
2F2009&id=pr519&sd=8%2F19%2F2009.
[73] Dan Frankowski, Dan Cosley, Shilad Sen, Loren Terveen, and
John Riedl. “You are what you say: privacy risks of public men-
tions.” In: International Conference on Research and Development
in Information Retrieval. ACM, 2006, pp. 565–572.
[74] Julien Freudiger, Reza Shokri, and Jean-Pierre Hubaux. “Eval-
uating the privacy risk of location-based services.” In: Inter-
national Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security.
Springer. 2011, pp. 31–46.
[75] Sébastien Gambs, Marc-Olivier Killijian, and Miguel Núñez
del Prado Cortez. “Show me how you move and I will tell you
who you are.” In: ACM Transactions on Data Privacy 4 (2011),
pp. 103–126.
[76] Sébastien Gambs, Marc-Olivier Killijian, and Miguel Núñez del
Prado Cortez. “Next place prediction using mobility markov
chains.” In: Workshop on Measurement, Privacy, and Mobility.
ACM. 2012, p. 3.
[77] Sébastien Gambs, Marc-Olivier Killijian, and Miguel Núñez del
Prado Cortez. “De-anonymization attack on geolocated data.”
In: Elsevier Journal of Computer and System Sciences 80 (2014),
pp. 1597–1614.
[78] Flavio D Garcia and Bart Jacobs. “Privacy-friendly energy-
metering via homomorphic encryption.” In: International Work-
shop on Security and Trust Management. Springer, 2010, pp. 226–
238.
[79] Gabriel Ghinita. “Privacy for location-based services.” In: Syn-
thesis Lectures on Information Security, Privacy, & Trust 4 (2013),
pp. 1–85.
[80] Marta C Gonzalez, Cesar A Hidalgo, and Albert-Laszlo Barabasi.
“Understanding individual human mobility patterns.” In: Na-
ture 453 (2008), p. 779.
[81] Australian Government. GOVAU Dataset. url: http://data.
gov.au/dataset/sample-household-electricity-time-of-
use-data.
[82] Ulrich Greveler, Benjamin Justus, and Dennis Loehr. “Forensic
content detection through power consumption.” In: Interna-
tional Conference on Communications. IEEE, 2012, pp. 6759–6763.
bibliography 109
[83] Marco Gruteser and Dirk Grunwald. “Anonymous usage of
location-based services through spatial and temporal cloaking.”
In: International Conference on Mobile Systems, Applications and
Services. ACM. 2003, pp. 31–42.
[84] Nicolas Haderer, Romain Rouvoy, Christophe Ribeiro, and
Lionel Seinturier. “Apisense: Crowd-sensing made easy.” In:
ERCIM News 93 (2013), pp. 28–29.
[85] George William Hart. “Nonintrusive appliance monitoring.”
In: Proceedings of the IEEE 80 (1992), pp. 1870–1891.
[86] Wajih Ul Hassan, Saad Hussain, and Adam Bates. “Analysis of
Privacy Protections in Fitness Tracking Social Networks-or-You
can run, but can you hide?” In: USENIX Security Symposium.
USENIX Association. 2018, pp. 497–512.
[87] Baik Hoh, Marco Gruteser, Hui Xiong, and Ansaf Alrabady.
“Enhancing security and privacy in traffic-monitoring systems.”
In: IEEE Pervasive Computing 5 (2006), pp. 38–46.
[88] Baik Hoh, Marco Gruteser, Hui Xiong, and Ansaf Alrabady.
“Preserving privacy in gps traces via uncertainty-aware path
cloaking.” In: Conference on Computer and Communications Secu-
rity. ACM, 2007, pp. 161–171.
[89] Leping Huang, Hiroshi Yamane, Kanta Matsuura, and Kaoru
Sezaki. “Silent cascade: Enhancing location privacy without
communication QoS degradation.” In: International Conference
on Security in Pervasive Computing. IEEE, 2006, pp. 165–180.
[90] Pecan Street Inc. Dataport Dataset. url: http : / / dataport .
pecanstreet.org.
[91] Georgios Kalogridis, Costas Efthymiou, Stojan Z Denic, Tim
A Lewis, and Rafael Cepeda. “Privacy for smart meters: To-
wards undetectable appliance load signatures.” In: International
Conference on Smart Grid Communications. IEEE, 2010, pp. 232–
237.
[92] Huan Feng Kassem Fawaz and Kang G Shin. “Anatomization
and protection of mobile apps’ location privacy threats.” In:
USENIX security symposium. USENIX Assosiation, 2015, pp. 753–
768.
[93] Youssef Khazbak and Guohong Cao. “Deanonymizing mo-
bility traces with co-location information.” In: Conference on
Communications and Network Security. IEEE, 2017, pp. 1–9.
[94] Wilhelm Kleiminger, Christian Beckel, and Silvia Santini. “House-
hold occupancy monitoring using electricity meters.” In: Inter-
national Joint Conference on Pervasive and Ubiquitous Computing.
ACM, 2015, pp. 975–986.
110 bibliography
[95] J Zico Kolter and Matthew J Johnson. “REDD: A public data
set for energy disaggregation research.” In: Workshop on Data
Mining Applications in Sustainability. Vol. 25. ACM, 2011, pp. 59–
62.
[96] Michal Kosinski, David Stillwell, and Thore Graepel. “Private
traits and attributes are predictable from digital records of
human behavior.” In: Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences of the United States of America 110.15 (2013), pp. 5802–
5805.
[97] John Krumm. “Inference attacks on location tracks.” In: In-
ternational Conference on Pervasive Computing. Springer. 2007,
pp. 127–143.
[98] John Krumm. “A survey of computational location privacy.”
In: Springer-Verlag Personal and Ubiquitous Computing 13 (2009),
pp. 391–399.
[99] Klaus Kursawe, George Danezis, and Markulf Kohlweiss. “Pri-
vacy - friendly aggregation for the smart-grid.” In: International
Symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies. Springer. 2011,
pp. 175–191.
[100] HY Lam, GSK Fung, and WK Lee. “A Novel method to con-
struct taxonomy electrical appliances based on load signature-
sof.” In: IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics 53 (2007),
pp. 653–660.
[101] Christopher Laughman, Kwangduk Lee, Robert Cox, Steven
Shaw, Steven Leeb, Les Norford, and Peter Armstrong. “Power
signature analysis.” In: IEEE Power and Energy Magazine 1 (2003),
pp. 56–63.
[102] Jack I Lerner and Deirdre K Mulligan. “Taking the ’long view’
on the fourth amendment: Stored records and the sanctity of
the home.” In: Stanford technology law review 3 (2008), p. 3.
[103] Fengjun Li, Bo Luo, and Peng Liu. “Secure information ag-
gregation for smart grids using homomorphic encryption.”
In: International Conference on Smart Grid Communications. IEEE,
2010, pp. 327–332.
[104] Ninghui Li, Tiancheng Li, and Suresh Venkatasubramanian.
“t-closeness: Privacy beyond k-anonymity and l-diversity.” In:
International Conference on Data Engineering. IEEE, 2007, pp. 106–
115.
[105] M. Lichman. UCI Machine Learning Repository. 2013. url: http:
//archive.ics.uci.edu/ml.
[106] Mikhail A Lisovich, Deirdre K Mulligan, and Stephen B Wicker.
“Inferring personal information from demand-response sys-
tems.” In: Symposium on Security and Privacy. Vol. 8. IEEE, 2010,
pp. 11–20.
bibliography 111
[107] Rongxing Lu, Xiaohui Liang, Xu Li, Xiaodong Lin, and Xuemin
Shen. “Eppa: An efficient and privacy-preserving aggregation
scheme for secure smart grid communications.” In: IEEE Trans-
actions on Parallel and Distributed Systems 23 (2012), pp. 1621–
1631.
[108] Changsha Ma and Chang Wen Chen. “Nearby friend discovery
with geo-indistinguishability to stalkers.” In: Elsevier Procedia
of Computer Science 34 (2014), pp. 352–359.
[109] Ashwin Machanavajjhala, Daniel Kifer, Johannes Gehrke, and
Muthuramakrishnan Venkitasubramaniam. “l-diversity: Pri-
vacy beyond k-anonymity.” In: ACM Transactions on Knowledge
Discovery from Data 1 (2007), p. 3.
[110] Stephen Makonin, Bradley Ellert, Ivan V. Bajic, and Fred Popo
wich. “Electricity, water, and natural gas consumption of a
residential house in Canada from 2012 to 2014.” In: Scientific
Data. Vol. 3. Nature Publishing Group, 2016, pp. 1–12.
[111] Félix Gómez Mármol, Christoph Sorge, Osman Ugus, and
Gregorio Martínez Pérez. “Do not snoop my habits: preserving
privacy in the smart grid.” In: Communications Magazine. Vol. 50.
IEEE, 2012, pp. 166–172.
[112] Wesley Mathew, Ruben Raposo, and Bruno Martins. “Predict-
ing future locations with hidden Markov models.” In: Confer-
ence on Ubiquitous Computing. ACM. 2012, pp. 911–918.
[113] Martin M Merener. “Theoretical results on de-anonymization
via linkage attacks.” In: ACM Transactions on Data Privacy 5
(2012), pp. 377–402.
[114] Andrés Molina-Markham, Prashant Shenoy, Kevin Fu, Em-
manuel Cecchet, and David Irwin. “Private memoirs of a smart
meter.” In: Workshop on Embedded Sensing Systems for Energy-
Efficiency in Building. ACM. 2010, pp. 61–66.
[115] Arvind Narayanan and Vitaly Shmatikov. “Robust deanonymiza-
tion of large sparse datasets.” In: Symposium on Security and
Privacy. IEEE, 2008, pp. 111–125.
[116] Energy Networks Association. Smart Meter Aggregation Assess-
ment Final Report. 2015. url: https://www.energynetworks.
org / assets / files / electricity / futures / smart _ meters /
FINAL REPORTS from consultants/Smart Meter Aggregation
Assessment Final Report - Executive Summary_V1 4 FINAL.
pdf.
[117] Helen Nissenbaum. Privacy in context: Technology, policy, and the
integrity of social life. Stanford University Press, 2009.
[118] Kellie A O’Shea. “Use of Social Media in Employment: Should
I Fire? Should I Hire?” In: Cornell HR Review (2012).
112 bibliography
[119] Alexandra-Mihaela Olteanu, Kévin Huguenin, Reza Shokri,
Mathias Humbert, and Jean-Pierre Hubaux. “Quantifying in-
terdependent privacy risks with location data.” In: IEEE Trans-
actions on Mobile Computing 16 (2017), pp. 829–842.
[120] Alexandra-Mihaela Olteanu, Mathias Humbert, K’evin Sotiris
Huguenin, and Jean-Pierre Hubaux. “The (Co-)Location Shar-
ing Game.” In: Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies. De
Gruyter Open, 2019.
[121] Rebekah Overdorf and Rachel Greenstadt. “Blogs, Twitter
Feeds, and Reddit Comments: Cross-domain Authorship Attri-
bution.” In: Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies 2016.3
(2016), pp. 155–171.
[122] Simon Oya, Carmela Troncoso, and Fernando Pérez-González.
“Back to the drawing board: Revisiting the design of optimal
location privacy-preserving mechanisms.” In: Conference on
Computer and Communications Security. ACM. 2017, pp. 1959–
1972.
[123] European Parliament and Council of the European Union. Di-
rective 2006/32/EC of the European Parliament and of the council.
2006.
[124] Javier Parra-Arnau, David Rebollo-Monedero, and Jordi Forné.
“Measuring the privacy of user profiles in personalized in-
formation systems.” In: Future Generation Computer Systems.
Elsevier, 2014, pp. 53–63.
[125] Dan Pelleg, Andrew W Moore, et al. “X-means: Extending
K-means with efficient estimation of the number of clusters.”
In: International Conference on Machine Learning. Vol. 1. Morgan
Kaufmann Publishers Inc. 2000, pp. 727–734.
[126] Noah Daniel Pflugradt. “Modellierung von Wasser und En-
ergieverbräuchen in Haushalten.” Dissertation. Technische Uni-
versität Chemnitz, 2016.
[127] Layla Pournajaf, Li Xiong, Vaidy Sunderam, and Xiaofeng Xu.
“Stac: Spatial task assignment for crowd sensing with cloaked
participant locations.” In: International Conference on Advances
in Geographic Information Systems. ACM. 2015, p. 90.
[128] Vincent Primault, Antoine Boutet, Sonia Ben Mokhtar, and Li-
onel Brunie. “The long road to computational location privacy:
A survey.” In: Communications Surveys & Tutorials. IEEE, 2018.
[129] Apostolos Pyrgelis, Carmela Troncoso, and Emiliano De Cristo-
faro. “Knock knock, who’s there? Membership inference on
aggregate location data.” In: Network and Distributed System
Security Symposium. The Internet Society, 2018.
bibliography 113
[130] Apostolos Pyrgelis, Carmela Troncoso, and Emiliano De Cristo-
faro. “What does the crowd say about you? Evaluating ag-
gregation based location privacy.” In: Proceedings on Privacy
Enhancing Technologies. De Gruyter Open, 2017, pp. 156–176.
[131] Feng Qiu and Junghoo Cho. “Automatic identification of user
interest for personalized search.” In: International Conference on
World Wide Web. ACM. 2006, pp. 727–736.
[132] Naren Ramakrishnan, Benjamin J Keller, Batul J Mirza, Ananth
Y Grama, and George Karypis. “Privacy risks in recommender
systems.” In: IEEE Internet Computing 6 (2001), pp. 54–62.
[133] Andrew G Reece and Christopher M Danforth. “Instagram
photos reveal predictive markers of depression.” In: EPJ Data
science 6 (2017), p. 15.
[134] “Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural
persons with regard to the processing of personal data and
on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation).” In: Official
journal of the European Union (2016).
[135] Moritz Rohling and Renate Schubert. “Energy labels for house-
hold appliances and their disclosure format: A literature re-
view.” In: Institute for Environmental Decisions (2013).
[136] Lalitha Sankar, S Raj Rajagopalan, and Soheil Mohajer. “Smart
meter privacy: A theoretical framework.” In: IEEE Transactions
on Smart Grid 4.2 (2013), pp. 837–846.
[137] Jing Shi, Rui Zhang, Yunzhong Liu, and Yanchao Zhang. “Prisense:
privacy-preserving data aggregation in people-centric urban
sensing systems.” In: International Conference on Computer Com-
munications. IEEE. 2010, pp. 1–9.
[138] Milad Shokouhi. “Learning to personalize query auto comple-
tion.” In: International Conference on Research and Development in
Information Retrieval. ACM. 2013, pp. 103–112.
[139] Reza Shokri, Julien Freudiger, Murtuza Jadliwala, and Jean-
Pierre Hubaux. “A distortion-based metric for location pri-
vacy.” In: Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society. ACM.
2009, pp. 21–30.
[140] Reza Shokri, George Theodorakopoulos, Jean-Yves Le Boudec,
and Jean-Pierre Hubaux. “Quantifying location privacy.” In:
Symposium on Security and Privacy. IEEE. 2011, pp. 247–262.
[141] Ayla Solomon, Raquel Hill, Erick Janssen, Stephanie A Sanders,
and Julia R Heiman. “Uniqueness and how it impacts privacy
in health-related social science datasets.” In: International Health
Informatics Symposium. ACM, 2012, pp. 523–532.
114 bibliography
[142] Chaoming Song, Zehui Qu, Nicholas Blumm, and Albert-
László Barabási. “Limits of predictability in human mobility.”
In: AAAS Science 327 (2010), pp. 1018–1021.
[143] Lukas G Swan and V Ismet Ugursal. “Modeling of end-use
energy consumption in the residential sector: A review of
modeling techniques.” In: Elsevier Renewable and Sustainable
Energy Reviews 13 (2009), pp. 1819–1835.
[144] Latanya Sweeney. “Simple demographics often identify people
uniquely.” In: Health 671 (2000), pp. 1–34.
[145] Latanya Sweeney. “k-anonymity: A model for protecting pri-
vacy.” In: World Scientific International Journal of Uncertainty,
Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based Systems 10 (2002), pp. 557–570.
[146] Fung Global Retail & Technology. Crowdsourcing:Seeking the
Wisdom of Crowds. url: http://www.deborahweinswig.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/Crowdsourcing-Report-by-Fung-
Global-Retail-Tech-July-12-2016.pdf.
[147] Jaime Teevan, Susan T Dumais, and Eric Horvitz. “Personaliz-
ing search via automated analysis of interests and activities.”
In: International Conference on Research and Development in Infor-
mation Retrieval. ACM. 2005, pp. 449–456.
[148] Manolis Terrovitis. “Privacy preservation in the dissemination
of location data.” In: ACM SIGKDD Explorations Newsletter 13
(2011), pp. 6–18.
[149] Devis Tuia, Claudio Persello, and Lorenzo Bruzzone. “Domain
adaptation for the classification of remote sensing data: An
overview of recent advances.” In: Geoscience and Remote Sensing
Magazine 4 (2016), pp. 41–57.
[150] U.S. Federal Trade Commission. Complying with COPPA: Frequently
Asked Questions. 2015.
[151] Jorim Urner, Dominik Bucher, Jing Yang, and David Jonietz.
“Assessing the influence of spatio-temporal context for next
place prediction using different machine learning approaches.”
In: ISPRS International Journal of Geo-Information 7 (2018), p. 166.
[152] Isabel Wagner and David Eckhoff. “Technical privacy metrics:
a systematic survey.” In: ACM Computing surveys 51 (2018).
[153] Hongjian Wang, Zhenhui Li, and Wang-Chien Lee. “PGT: Mea-
suring mobility relationship using personal, global and tempo-
ral factors.” In: International Conference on Data Mining. IEEE,
2014, pp. 570–579.
[154] Alan F Westin and Oscar M Ruebhausen. Privacy and freedom.
Vol. 1. Atheneum New York, 1967.
bibliography 115
[155] Yonghui Xiao and Li Xiong. “Protecting locations with differ-
ential privacy under temporal correlations.” In: Conference on
Computer and Communications Security. ACM. 2015, pp. 1298–
1309.
[156] Fengli Xu, Zhen Tu, Yong Li, Pengyu Zhang, Xiaoming Fu,
and Depeng Jin. “Trajectory recovery from ash: User privacy
is not preserved in aggregated mobility data.” In: International
Conference on World Wide Web. IW3C2. 2017, pp. 1241–1250.
[157] Hui Zang and Jean Bolot. “Anonymization of location data
does not work: A large-scale measurement study.” In: Inter-
national Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking. ACM.
2011, pp. 145–156.
[158] Zijian Zhang, Zhan Qin, Liehuang Zhu, Jian Weng, and Kui
Ren. “Cost-friendly differential privacy for smart meters: ex-
ploiting the dual roles of the noise.” In: IEEE Transactions on
Smart Grid 8 (2017), pp. 619–626.
[159] Expert Group for regulatory recommendations for privacy, data
protection and cyber-security in the smart grid environment.
Essential regulatory requirements and recommendations for data
handling, data safety, and consumer protection. 2011. url: https:
//ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/
Recommendations regulatory requirements v1.pdf.

D E C L A R AT I O N
I hereby assure that I have prepared the present dissertation without
the help of third parties only with the indicated sources and tools. All
passages taken from sources are identified as such. This work did not
exist in the same or similar form to any examining authority.
Darmstadt, February 2019
Spyridon Boukoros
